May it please the Court:
I
I am submitting this amicus brief in my capacity as a legislator. I submit this brief solely on the question of justiciability and take no position at this time on the merits of the underlying legal question.
The Court is to determine whether the legal question submitted by UnitedDisneyStates concerning whether the word “commence” in Art. IV § 4 of the Charter requires that debate begin on March 15, or that voting itself begin on March 15, is justiciable. For the reasons set forth below, I submit that it must be. The question presents a genuine ambiguity, implicates a contradiction between the Charter and the Legislative Procedure Act, and arose from a concrete controversy. All elements for justiciability are satisfied.
II
This Court’s jurisdiction to decide legal questions is grounded in the Charter and the Judiciary Act. Art. VII § 6 of the Charter provides that “the High Court may clarify and interpret provisions of law when presented with a Legal Question about them.” The Judiciary Act, Art. 3 § 1(a) further defines a Legal Question as “a question on the meaning of a law or the applicability of a law to a concrete or hypothetical question.”
This Court has addressed justiciability in several in-chambers opinions. For example, in [2506.HQ] Concerning the Procedural Requirements of § 2(2) of the Regional Officers Act, nonjusticiable, the Court held that “[l]egal questions are a mechanism by which the Court can ‘clarify’ the meaning or applicability of law, which naturally requires that there be some ambiguity to clarify.” Similarly, in [2406.HQ] Government Accountability in Sunshine Releases, nonjusticiable, the Court declined to exercise jurisdiction because “the questions presented to it do not seek to interpret an ambiguous provision of law or resolve a contradiction between conflicting laws.”
Reading these opinions together, a legal question is justiciable where: (1) there is an ambiguous provision of law to be clarified, or (2) there is a contradiction between conflicting laws to be resolved. This case satisfies both prongs.
III
A
Art. IV § 4 of the Charter provides that “annual retention votes… shall commence on March 15”. The word “commence” is susceptible to at least two reasonable interpretations. That the debate period commences on March 15, or that voting itself commences on March 15. This ambiguity is concrete, as is apparent from the retention vote thread.
For example, Pronoun stated: “I’m not sure what a ‘draft’ of a retention vote is but it does read to me like retention votes have a debate period — maybe I’m wrong?”.
The ambiguity is further confirmed by the practice of the Assembly itself. UnitedDisneyStates stated that “I don’t think your wrong Pronoun because I remember last time we had debate time and I mentioned that in the discord channel.”
In the prior year’s retention vote, the Chair of the Assembly opened debate on March 15. Three days later, when opening the vote, the Deputy Chair stated that it was done “[p]ursuant to the requirement of Charter Section IV.(4), which mandates that this vote be called by the Chair of the Assembly or their designee on March 15.” The Deputy Chair’s language, “called by… on March 15” suggests a reading that March 15 triggers a beginning of the debate period, not necessarily the commencement of voting. See, [2518.RV] Retention Votes 2025: The Admiralty.
B
Even if the text of Art. IV § 4 were considered unambiguous standing alone, the question would remain justiciable under the second prong, as it implicates a potential contradiction between the Charter and the Legislative Procedure Act. This Court is expressly empowered under Art. VII § 5 to “reconcile contradictions within the Charter, constitutional laws, general laws, and Executive Orders, maintaining the least amount of disruption to the intended purposes of the contradictory parts.”
Legislative Procedure Act, Art. 1 § 3(d), requires that retention votes “have been at debate for a minimum period of time equivalent to the length of its voting period.” before being brought to a vote. Art 1. § 4 further provides that retention votes “will remain at vote for three days.” If Art. IV § 4 of the Charter is read to require that voting commence on March 15, then compliance with Legislative Procedure Act Art. 1 § 3(d)'s mandatory debate period would be impossible whenever March 15 falls without a preceding debate, as occurred here. Utopia identified this in the debate thread, asking whether “the supremacy clause of Article I Section 3 of the Charter overrules the Legislative Procedure act to have the votes start today even without the debate period?”
C
The Judiciary Act defines a Legal Question as “a question on the meaning of a law or the applicability of a law to a concrete or hypothetical situation.” This matter arises from a concrete situation. The Chair of the Assembly brought retention votes to a vote on March 15 without observing a debate period, sparking immediate debate among legislators about whether this action was lawful.
IV
The legal question submitted presents a genuine ambiguity in Art. IV § 4 of the Charter, implicates a potential contradiction between the Charter and the Legislative Procedure Act, and arises from a concrete controversy within the Assembly. Under the standard established by the Court’s prior case law, the case is justiciable.
Respectfully submitted,
ERSTAVIK