I’ve noticed a contradiction between the Charter and the Legislative Procedure Act concerning accession to the Chair.
IV(5) of the Charter states that, in the event of a vacancy, “a new Chair will be elected,” whereas 2(4) of the Legislative Procedure Act requires “the senior-most Deputy Chair of the Assembly” become Chair.
The Charter is supreme over other constitutional laws, so Welly’s accession to the Chair is seemingly illegitimate.
This is a fairly simple fix, although there are two main options: elect a new Chair or deputy becomes Chair. Or, we could have it so that it depends on if the vacancy happened in the first or second half of the term.
Regardless, we presumably also need a Chair resolution to ensure that Welly remains as Chair.
I think it would be better to keep the system of succession, to be honest. I think the other method would require modification of both the Charter and the Legislative Procedure Act.
Alternatively, I think it’s fine (and honestly neater) that Chair succession is defined in a separate law instead of the Charter. Also, I think it’s a two-letter fix?
In any case I think resolutions are frequently filled with useless fluff that obscure the part with actual consequential effect. Here’s one that would select Welly to serve until the expiration of Nwahs’ original term.
Harsh way to put it. Ultimately, I disagree. This is a political game and I enjoy some ceremony in it. I will have another draft of the resolution up tonight.
In my capacity as a legislator, I also support Cryo’s amendment for the sake of removing any ambiguity in the Assembly’s succession procedures. And, as I mentioned in my statement on the Chair transition, I am amenable to a resolution confirming my service for the remainder of Nwahs’ term.
In my official capacity as Chair, I’ll state that I do not view the current provisions of the Legislative Procedure Act as being in violation of the Charter. The Charter empowers the Assembly to set the “date, time, and manner of electing the Chair in a law,” including for elections that take place following a vacancy in the office of Chair. The Assembly has exercised that authority in the Legislative Procedure Act. That Act specifies that in the case of vacancy in the office of Chair, an election for Chair shall be held either at the expiration of the previous Chair’s term or at any time prior to that at the Assembly’s discretion, with the Deputy Chair assuming the Chair’s office until such an election is held. I interpret that provision as setting the time and manner of the Chair election in accordance with the authority vested in the Assembly by the Charter. I acknowledge that the procedure set forth in the Legislative Procedure Act is in some conceptual tension with the Charter’s command that an election be held to replace the Chair in case of vacancy, which could be read as requiring an immediate election. But I do not view that tension as irreconcilable. And when the Chair is called upon to interpret the Charter and laws in the exercise their official duties, the Chair should strive to reconcile any potential contradictions and give effect to both legal provisions. Cf. Charter Article VII, Section (5) (directing the High Court to “reconcile contradictions within the Charter, constitutional laws, general laws, and Executive Orders, maintaining the least amount of disruption to the intended purposes of the contradictory parts.”). Since I do not read these two provisions as being in irreconcilable conflict, the Chair’s office will continue to abide by the succession procedure in the Legislative Procedure Act unless and until that procedure is held to violate the Charter by the High Court.
That’s a fair assessment. It’s worth noting that IV(5) of the Charter has seen hardly any changes since (at least) 2022. The use of “elect” at the time included special elections whenever a vacancy arose in the Chair. Regardless, even if it can be reconciled with the Leg. Proc. Act, I feel it would still be better to clarify the law and make clear that you are the Chair.