This is my proposed solution to the problem we have had with Delegate elections in recent times, and with the most recent election leading to a quarter of votes being ruled invalid by the Election Commissioner.
It will establish clear procedures and standards for the adjudication of doubtful ballots, following real life best practice and guidance.
Opposed. Officials should not be substituting voter expression for their own subjecting interpretation.
A system where one official voids a quarter of votes at the election is not democratic.
While legislation that allows for the interpretation of invalid votes like this is needed, I donât support this. The booklet isnât designed to translate invalid votes into an approval or IRV voting system. I think we would be much better off writing up our own similar guidelines.
The examples are designed around FPTP (as that is how UK elections are conducted) but are fairly universal in application. The guidance in example 16 addresses the issue with the doubtful votes in the recent Delegate election.
Weâre still better off writing our own, that way we can cover other situations we are likely to come across that arenât covered.
Additionally, what if we want a ranked ballot in an approval election to translate to an approval for everyone ranked above RON as was mentioned here? I donât know which method people like more, that one or the one covered in example 16, but by writing our own we have more control.
The booklet is much better than nothing, but this proposed amendment would be a lot better off with our own ones since weâre interpreting invalid votes into two different voting systems, neither of which are the one that that booklet contains guidelines specifically for.
Opposed to introducing subjective opinions of the ballot counting process. Would rather we change the voting system so weâre only using the one ballot, instead of two.
Agree with Henn, I would rather change the voting system
Opposed, at this point, just change the voting system to just one ballot instead of two.
Iâve stripped out the references to the UKEC guidance as that seemed the most contentious bit. Now the amendment just requires the EC to apply common sense.
This is going to sound sarcastic, but I really donât mean it to beâwhat is the meaning of âclearlyâ in this clause? In other words, what level of confidence would a reasonable person need to have in their deduction of the voterâs intent for a ballot to be considered valid? Just more than 50%? Or do you mean something like âclear and convincing evidenceâ in the law, which is usually shorthanded as 75%? Even higher?
We only have two electoral systems. If we want to go down this route, I think itâs easier to codify what we want in each case (voting approval in an IRV election, voting IRV in an approval election) than to defer to common sense. Frankly, weâve gotten into sillier arguments before, and spelling out something like âanything ranked above RON is considered approvedâ or âanything given a ranking is considered approvedâ is not that many words.
Iâm not actually sure how weâd interpret an approval ballot as an IRV ballot though. I donât think a reasonable person can clearly infer ranked preferences from unranked approvals? Maybe the current assumption is that this is not the general case, but itâs exactly what happened last time.
An unranked approval with more than one approved in an IRV election isnât something we can infer and is probably one of the cases where a vote has to be thrown out
Not all ballots subject to adjudication would end up being ruled valid - here and some examples I have put together and how I would interpret them.
EXAMPLE 1 - Ranking all candidates
In this ballot the voter has ranked candidates A, B, C & D preferentially instead of marking them as an X. However, the fact that they have ranked all candidates but not RON is an expression of voter intention - they prefer candidate A, but approve of B, C and D as well.
This ballot should be adjudicated as valid vote for A, B, C & D.
EXAMPLE 2 - Ranking some candidates above RON and others bellow RON
On this ballot the voter has ranked all candidates plus RON, but candidates A & C have been ranked above RON and candidates B & D below RON.
The fact that some candidates are ranked above RON shows voting intention - as such this ballot should be adjudicated as a valid vote for A & C.
EXAMPLE 3 - Marking all candidates with X in IRV
This voter has marked all candidates with an X on an IRV ballot. As voter intention cannot be determined the ballot should be adjudicated as invalid.
EXAMPLE 4 - Marking one candidate with X in IRV
This voter has marked one candidate with an X, expressing clear voter intention. This ballot should be adjudicated as valid and counted as a first preference vote for B.
In UK practice the (A)RO (Acting Returning Officer) has to be satisfied that they know what the voter intended, based on legal precedent and guidance from the Commission. If the (A)RO is not able to identify clear voting intention then the ballot should be ruled invalid. I donât think there is a formal percentage level of certainty - Iâve never heard an (A)RO say âIâm 90% certain this is a voter for Baker so Iâm allowing it.â
Since @Wellyâs IRV Amendment died out and weâre not debating on it anymore and it will most likely not go to a vote, I think I will share my thoughts about this now. I am not fully in love with this, I donât think it will solve the problem entirely, I think many of the ballots that are considered âdoubtfulâ were still be considered invalid at the end, However, I do really like the ballot examples though. Also, I live in the US, and most likely a super majority of us live in the US, I donât really know what the UK does, and my fear is this is just a copy of the UKâs way of interpreting ballots, and we are a region of NS, we shouldnât be copying a way a RL country interprets ballots, we should be making up our own way of interpreting ballots. I also feel this is more of an over complicating way of trying to solve the ballot problem, as there is many new steps added in on how to interpret ballots. I personally prefer more a simple way to solve the ballot problem, either making up a new idea, or reconsidering Wellyâs IRV Amendment.
As the IRV amendment has failed at vote I motion this version of the Adjudication amendment to vote.
I second.
For what itâs worth, I think Belschaftâs examples are much clearer than the amendment itself, and codifying the cases we want to deal with (given we only have two voting systems) seems clearer to me than just leaving it up to âreasonable deduction.â
