[2417.AB] Draft World Assembly Act

Assembly,

I come to propose a draft World Assembly Act for your consideration. If enacted, this bill, co-written with @lordnwahs and with consultation from @ProfessorHenn, would repeal and replace the current WA Act.

The primary goals of this legislation are straightforward: (1) to clarify and streamline the method by which TSP’s votes on WA resolutions are determined and (2) to increase regional engagement with that process.

Since the bill is relatively long, here are the key changes from the current WA Act:

  • The system of establishing vote recommendations has been rewritten; it was difficult to understand (at least for me) in the current Act. Now, the process is relatively simple: (1) the PM can direct the Delegate to vote a certain way for diplomatic or security reasons; (2) if the PM does not issue such a direction, then the Delegate’s vote will presumptively be determined by a regional vote run by the OWL; (3) if the OWL fails to hold a regional vote within 24 hours of voting closing on a resolution, then the Delegate will vote in line with the majority of TSP votes cast gameside.
  • The system for Delegate approvals has been amended to clarify the OWL Director’s ability to instruct the Delegate to approve a resolution in the queue and to empower the PM to order the withdrawal of an approval on security or diplomatic grounds.
  • The OWL Director is no longer required to be a Cabinet position. This gives the PM more flexibility in structuring the position–they can make the Director a Cabinet member if they choose, or they can immediately appoint someone to the role without the necessity of an Assembly confirmation vote.
  • The restriction on SPSF approval raiding has been removed, given that it seems duplicative of the general restriction on SPSF raiding activity in the Military Code (but SPSF leadership, please correct if that is not the case).
  • The section on Security Council Declarations has been removed. It wasn’t entirely clear to us why it was necessary, but are curious if anyone has a contrary view.

Without further ado, here is the proposal. We look forward to hearing everyone’s thoughts, comments, edits, etc., on the draft.

New WA Act Draft

World Assembly Act

An act to define the World Assembly procedures of the Coalition of the South Pacific

1. The Office of World Assembly Legislation

(1) The Office of World Assembly Legislation shall be a permanent executive department that shall be responsible for coordinating the Coalition’s activities in the World Assembly, providing assistance in drafting resolutions, and issuing voting recommendations on World Assembly proposals.

(2) The Office of World Assembly Legislation shall be led by a Director chosen by the Prime Minister.

  1. The Director must be a citizen of the Coalition.
  2. The Director shall not be a member of the Cabinet unless expressly appointed by the Prime Minister as a Cabinet minister and confirmed by the Assembly.
  3. The Director shall serve at the pleasure of the Prime Minister and shall remain in office until dismissed by the Prime Minister.

2. Voting on World Assembly Resolutions

(1) The Office of World Assembly Resolution shall adopt a voting recommendation on each World Assembly resolution.

  1. The Director shall consult with the Prime Minister in a timely fashion regarding the security and diplomatic implications of each World Assembly resolution.
  2. The Prime Minister may, for legitimate security or diplomatic reasons only, instruct the Office of World Assembly Legislation to adopt a particular voting recommendation.
  3. If the Prime Minister instructs the Office of World Assembly Legislation to adopt a particular voting recommendation, then the Director shall adopt and issue that recommendation to all members of the Coalition via a public forum.
  4. If the Prime Minister gives no instruction to the Office of World Assembly Legislation, then the Director shall adopt and issue a voting recommendation as determined by the results of a vote open to all members of the Coalition with World Assembly nations currently resident in the South Pacific, or who are currently members of the South Pacific Special Forces. The Office of World Assembly Legislation may determine the appropriate medium and method of voting on recommendations.

(2) Provided that the Office of World Assembly Legislation has adopted a voting recommendation pursuant to the procedures set forth in this section, the Delegate shall cast their vote on proposed World Assembly resolutions according to such recommendations. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Delegate may disregard an Office of World Assembly Legislation voting recommendation that was adopted pursuant to a regional vote administered by the Director if, within twenty-four hours of the close of gameside voting on the World Assembly resolution to which such a recommendation pertains, such recommendation is contrary to at least two-thirds of the votes of World Assembly members in the South Pacific as reflected in the World-Assembly-administered gameside poll.

(3) If the Office of World Assembly Legislation fails to adopt a voting recommendation pursuant to the procedures set forth in this section within twenty-four hours of the close of gameside voting on any World Assembly resolution, then the Delegate shall cast their vote on such proposed World Assembly resolutions in accordance with the current majority vote of World Assembly members in the South Pacific as reflected in the World-Assembly-administered gameside poll at the time the Delegate casts their vote. If said gameside poll is tied, then the Delegate shall abstain from voting on the resolution.

3. Approvals

(1) The Office of World Assembly Legislation may instruct the Delegate to approve a proposed World Assembly Resolution.

(2) In the absence of an instruction from the Office of World Assembly Legislation, the Delegate may approve proposed World Assembly resolutions in their discretion.

(3) The Delegate shall inform both the Director of the Office of World Assembly Legislation and the Prime Minister in a timely fashion upon approving a proposed World Assembly Resolution.

(4) The Prime Minister may, for legitimate security or diplomatic reasons only, instruct the Delegate to withdraw their approval of a proposed World Assembly resolution.

4. Legal Impact of Security Council Declarations

(1) Declarations adopted by the World Assembly Security Council shall not be recognized, abided by, or considered law within areas subject to the jurisdiction of the South Pacific unless adopted as law by the Assembly.

I have… thoughts… on this…

I’ll post them in the next few hours.

As it stands, I oppose many of these proposed changes and would vote against them if they were put to the vote in their current form.


What I support:

  • I support the process for deciding what the recommendation should be being written into the law. This ensures a standard, predictable process.
    – I like the public posting of the recommendations. I think a simple ping on Discord is insufficient.

What I do not support:

  • I am inclined to support the changes made to the selection of OWL Director and their relationship with the Cabinet.
    – That being said, I disagree that this position should be a unilateral PM appointment. All appointments should be processed and approved by the Assembly. Additionally, I would hope that the MoFA and OWL Director are in frequent discussions, especially if diplomatic considerations are a primary consideration for PM overrides on votes. So at that point, is there a benefit to the OWL Director being outside the Cabinet?
  • I do not support removing much of the Delegate’s discretion.
    – The Delegate can and should be able to vote with the majority of the region insofar as the PM has made an order to the contrary on diplomatic/security grounds.
  • Approval Voting Changes
    – I do not support removing the Delegate’s discretion as it relates to approvals. If I (or any Delegate) had to inform the PM and OWL Director that I approved each little resolution, then the effect would be no approvals being made.
    – Additionally, as it stands, I receive 3-5 Telegrams daily (15-25 weekly) from various authors and supporters of resolutions asking for my input and/or approval vote. My approval of a bill does not guarantee it a vote in the WA, nor does it represent an endorsement from the South Pacific since many WA Authors are aware that the Delegate does not represent the government.
    – Approvals, if used properly, are very much a “you scratch my back, and I’ll scratch your back” way to build our WA Presence. If we can build a group of resolution writers in our region, they will wish that the Delegate had done an appropriate amount of back-scratching to get their resolution to the voting floor.
  • I made it clear in my campaign that I intend to be among the first nations (and definitely first delegate) to vote on any given resolution in the WA. This is an easy way to give the region immense power in the WA by being a large chunk of the early vote trendsetting.
    – If OWL or the PM does not remain steadfastly focused on their jobs or gets backlogged, the result is the Delegate having to wait till near the end of voting to lodge their vote. By then, the outcome of the vote will likely have already been pretty convincingly determined, thus throwing away what influence we could have had.
    – Abstaining from tied votes is dumb and another way to lose out on influence in the WA.
  • I do not like that the Delegate is not a named individual in discussions for voting recommendations and/or other discussion for security/diplomatic discussions.
    – I understand that it is implied that the Delegate (as a citizen) can vote on which way OWL should recommend the vote go, but giving them a role in the process would help, especially with the potential workload on an OWL Director.
    – As for security/diplomatic discussions, the Delegate should be a part of the conversation as it relates to making those determinations. It certainly isn’t up to the Delegate to determine what constitutes a compelling security/diplomatic consideration, but I would at least want to know that the override decision made is based on good information and decision-making rather than a simple “do as the PM/OWL Director says”/smoke-filled room directive.
  • I do not support removing the declaration provisions. I do support clarifying them and making them short and sweet, but I do not support their removal.
    – The Security Council could, at any time, declare defenders to be “dumb organizations that should be disbanded” or Feeder regions to be “abolished so that frontiers can have greater spawn rates,” and passage of such a declaration is considered binding on all member nations/regions, even if it’s obviously against the policy of the region. The region is lucky to be broadly a part of the majority governing coalition of the WA at the moment, but that could change, and you don’t want to be on the wrong side of resolutions/declarations.
    – These provisions ensure that our government does not recognize declarations, even those we agree with, as official regional policy.

Overall, Delegates have traditionally held more discretion over the WA, albeit with occasional overrides from the PM/Cabinet. Keeping that discretion will allow the region’s soft power in the WA to remain.

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Thanks for all of the feedback–you have certainly given me (and the region) quite a bit to reflect on. While I’m doing that, I wonder if you might help me understand one of your comments:

Do you mean that the Delegate should be able to cast their vote in line with the majority of the TSP gameside vote, even if that vote is contrary to the OWL recommendation, as long as it is not contrary to a security / diplomatic voting instruction from the PM? If so, how does this work as a practical matter, given the additional objective of having the Delegate vote quickly? Because if the Delegate always votes quickly, then they won’t really know what way the majority of TSP votes are going, as most will have not yet been cast. So is the idea that the Delegate should vote immediately based on the OWL recommendation but if it becomes clear after a few more days of voting that the OWL recommendation is totally unrepresentative of the will of the region, then the Delegate should be able to change their vote? If so, I could get behind inserting a fail-safe provision to this effect.

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Thanks for your constructive comments Griff. On a personal note, your comments on the role of the delegate in the WA in your most recent re-election campaign were what inspired me to think more about how best to restructure the WA Act. What I will say is that I’m sure that whatever emerges from this will certainly be a more coherent piece of legislation than what we have now, and I really do hope that you will come to support this bill.


To address your comments:

Thank you. This is indeed one of my primary motivations behind pursuing WA Act reform, and I am glad that you are in favor of what we have proposed on that front.

To be clear, the intention of spelling the OWL Director position out in this manner is so that it is more akin to a position that the PM has discretion over, rather than forcing an incoming PM to effectively have to put a OWL Director up to vote every single term in the assembly if they don’t necessarily want to bear the full brunt of the appointment. The idea is that this maximizes the PM’s discretion over cabinet priorities under our current system of an appointed, rather than elected cabinet. Depending on the PM’s priorities, they could still appoint a full cabinet minister to this position (which would need Assembly approval under the Charter), either to take on the OWL appointment alone as a “Minister for the OWL”, or as a separate portfolio that, say, the MoFA could take on.

I would also note that not every office in the Coalition, even currently, has to necessarily be subject to Assembly approval, though that is probably not the main point here.

I’ll refer to Welly’s earlier clarifying question on this.

Point taken. The rationale behind the Delegate updating the PM on approvals is that there may always be legitimate reasons why an innocuous approval might have diplomatic and security ramifications. This updating can always be done in batches - you/future delegates don’t necessarily need to ping the OWL/PM the second you approve another proposal without any instructions from the OWL.

I have to clarify that scenarios where an abstention would occur in practice would be extremely rare (either the OWL vote recommends an abstention, or in the absence of an OWL recommendation, the gameside poll has to be completely tied). That being said, abstention in this circumstance would reflect that the proposal at-vote is clearly divisive in one way or another, and the Delegate voting one way or another would probably not reflect the mood of the region properly.

I would personally think that an absence by a TSP delegate in a WA vote would still be quite noticeable, and would not diminish our influence in the WA, so long as the delegate endocount remains high and the PM/OWL continues to put in the hard work behind the scenes to interact with WA authors and other regions.

This is where we would need to draw the line on what is permissible for a Delegate to do in our system of government, since these are still the responsibilities of the PM under the Charter. I am keenly aware of what you said in your re-election thread back in January, and Henn has also made his point clear there as well.

On my end, I would note that the Delegate does not have any such powers under the current WA Act either, and I hope that your views on the matter do not detract from the aim of pushing forth a clearer and more straightforward WA Act. We can always consider and debate a proposal afterwards on what are reasonable parameters for Delegate involvement, but I see this as orthogonal to the bill that Welly and I are proposing.

Point taken. As Welly mentioned, we weren’t entirely sure what was the purpose of the section as a whole, and the language certainly felt quite out of place relative to the rest of the WA Act. Welly and I are fine with adding back a shortened version of the declaration provision.

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Yes! That is the intention :stuck_out_tongue:

Apologies if that was not made clear. Ultimately, the small group of WA Nations that vote on OWL Resolutions will carry the day most of the time, but they should not always outweigh the majority of the WA Nations in the region.

Ahh, ok. I think I see what you are getting at. If I do, then I recommend adding a provision saying that they serve at the pleasure of the PM, but their term is indefinite.

Correct, but all government positions are elected or assembly confirmed. OWL Director is a government position and should thus be confirmed.

I can see the logic, but it is an unnecessary addition. Perhaps that gives the OWL Director/PM more incentive to look through approvals :stuck_out_tongue:

Perhaps instead, writing that an approval of a resolution does not give an “implicit or explicit” (to borrow from the declarations section) endorsement of it by the government of the South Pacific.

I think I may have not been as clear as I could have been (blame my 12AM drafting session). :stuck_out_tongue:
I completely agree that if the OWL/PM recommendation/override says to abstain, then the delegate should abstain. In that instance, an evenly split region should be treated like a coin flip, and the delegate’s judgment should be rendered (who knows, the delegate may decide abstention is the best option).

Of course not! I am certainly not suggesting that the Delegate be intimately involved in debating and deciding the regional/diplomatic/security policy. I am more than happy (as any Delegate should be) to simply press the buttons that the decision-makers order me to. However, I do not think the Delegate should blindly accept “cause we say so, just trust us” every single time. Sometimes yes, all the time, no. Being aware of the context behind decisions is essential.

If the PM/OWL told the delegate to vote FOR a resolution condemning the South Pacific (or an ally), I would definitely take pause and insist upon the rationale for the decision being made. Obviously, the vast majority of those decisions won’t be like that, but the ones that are should be discussed.

True, but the small amount of discretion delegates currently have is currently under review :wink:

That’s funny, because just a few months ago you were asking us to just trust the Delegate

I don’t know why Delegate ‘discretion’ is suddenly so important, except for… the current Delegate… who just a few months ago, wanted us not to defer to the ‘majority of WA nations in the region’ but rather to just trust the Delegate to vote however they felt was ‘best for the region.’ And this is coming from the same person who gave the Prime Minister the statutory responsibility — which cannot be delegated! — to oversee ‘the Coalition’s interest in World Assembly matters.’

Voting with an early global majority is a well-observed pattern with WA votes, and that includes the ‘majority of WA nations in the region.’ If you want more people to participate in OWL votes… take it up with the PM?

For what it’s worth, I don’t know if we actually need OWL to be this weird pseudo-ministry that’s part of the executive but not the Cabinet. We have this weird structure because a WA ministry felt like a lot back when we had fixed ministries set in the Charter, but I’m not sure why OWL needs to have its own unique structure.

In the absence of an OWL/PM recommendation… not on all WA matters. My statement still stands on that. Further, our new OWL director appears to be doing a fantastic job thus far, and if he keeps it up, will likely make much of what we are debating about moot.

And my reference to trust in this thread was being aware of context when some more unclear or controversial recommendations are given… The PM/OWL recommendations should and will be carried out.

It is not “suddenly” so important; I just do not see the rationale for removing the little discretion that the Delegate does have. If there is a trend of me or past delegates voting against recommendations and otherwise ignoring the actual decision-makers, then I would absolutely understand such a move. But that has not happened and will not happen. The Assembly could approve these changes, and I will, of course, adapt to the will of the region. I just don’t see the need for some of these changes.

So when there’s an OWL/PM recommendation, the Delegate should have the option of deferring to the majority of regional WA nations, but not to just decide themselves. But if there’s no recommendation, the Delegate should just decide themselves, and not defer to the majority of regional WA nations…?

Realistically, the ‘majority of regional WA nations’ is just a function of whatever the global majority is — which itself is often just a function of how the early high-endorsement delegates voted. That’s the point behind having our own vote so that those engaged with our region and WA process can have the opportunity to wield our regional WA power the way we as a region want, rather than just going along with whatever happens to be the majority in the world. It also means that there’s a direct, fairly easy-to-exploit perverse incentive to letting the Delegate just decide, at their discretion, to follow the regional majority instead. If a Delegate doesn’t like the result of an OWL vote on a resolution where other high-endorsement regions may feel differently, they can just not be around to vote early, wait a day, then choose to follow the regional majority. And is there really a way to actually distinguish between hoping the regional majority changes and just genuinely being offline?

I’m not sure why there has to be a pattern of Delegates overstepping their legally allowed role for us to change the law. It’s not like the Assembly should only amend laws if they are habitually violated…?

Voting on WA resolutions is a political matter — something that, I would argue, falls under the purview of the head of government rather than the head of state. Certainly, the Delegate plays an important ceremonial role in casting our region’s vote, but there’s a reason that the Prime Minister has a constitutional responsibility to direct our regional interest in the WA. And we have a mechanism for holding the Prime Minister accountable for their responsibilities! I would tend to prefer empowering citizens and legislators to hold the executive to account — as is well-established throughout our system of government — instead of deferring to the ‘discretion’ of a single, intentionally apolitical office.

In light of the discussion thus far, we have made three amendments to the proposed Act, which are reflected in the draft above:

  • Clarifying that the OWL Director serves at the pleasure of the Prime Minister and remains in office until dismissed by the PM.
  • Adding a “fail-safe” clause permitting the Delegate to disregard a vote-based OWL recommendation (but not a PM-instruction-based recommendation) if that recommendation is contrary to the gameside regional vote. To account for Pronoun’s legitimate concerns about the Delegate waiting to cast their ballot, we have limited the fail-safe clause to situations in which the OWL recommendation is contrary to at least two-thirds of the gameside regional votes.
  • Reinserting a provision limiting the legal impact of Security Council declarations.

On other issues that have been raised:

Given that the OWL Director’s responsibilities are largely administrative, it doesn’t strike us as desirable or necessary that their appointment be held up by an Assembly vote. After all, Deputy Ministers are government positions, and they can be named without an Assembly vote. It’s not clear that the OWL Director should be treated differently. If the PM wants the OWL Director to be a member of the Cabinet, take on more substantive government responsibilities, or be combined with another Cabinet position (e.g., MoFA), then the PM can always create an OWL ministry or combine the role of Director with another Cabinet ministry. In which case the ministerial portion of that appointment would require Assembly confirmation.

Why is a notification requirement unnecessary? When the apolitical Delegate exercises discretion to approve a resolution, they should inform politically accountable officials (i.e., the PM and OWL Director) of that action. To be sure, it would be onerous for the Delegate to do so at the exact moment they approve each resolution, but a weekly batch notification seems reasonable.

As for a disclaimer provision, it strikes us as unlikely that it would substantially affect foreign perception of Delegate approvals. For one thing, only those foreign observers with a detailed understanding of our law would even be aware of the disclaimer provision; many others would most likely assume, quite naturally, that the Delegate’s approval signifies some support for that action by TSP’s government. And doesn’t it? Let’s say the foreign observer studied our law sufficiently to learn about the disclaimer. At the same time, that observer would also see that the PM / OWL Director can instruct the Delegate to withhold or withdraw approvals. So wouldn’t they be correct in assuming that the government has at least acquiesced in if not affirmatively endorsed the Delegate’s approval decisions? Otherwise, the government would have instructed the Delegate not to approve.

If the region’s judgement is evenly split, then why should that tie be broken (shattered, actually, given the huge weight of the Delegate’s vote) by an apolitical figure? It seems that the status quo–i.e., a tie vote–should be left in place, rather than the Delegate placing an overwhelming thumb on one side of the scale.

Speaking for myself only here, I agree that, in such an extraordinary situation, the Delegate should exercise the appropriate role of a head of state and advise / warn the government of the day against such an ill-advised action. But I’m hesitant to codify such a soft power in law. There is nothing in the current bill that prevents the Delegate from taking that action.

I still feel that giving the Delegate the option, but not obligation, to change their vote unnecessarily politicizes a role that should, by design, be apolitical. Why should the Delegate have the power to decide whether gameside voters matter more than OWL voters? Just as you ask why a tie should be broken by the Delegate as an apolitical figure — why should a division between gameside and OWL voters be broken by that apolitical figure?

Except we do treat OWL differently, because it’s an office codified into law, unlike any deputy ministers. (And I’m still not sure it needs this special treatment.)

I think there’s also some irony to the notion that an apolitical position should perform political actions (because discretion!), but if we put a disclaimer that our literal head of state does not represent our government, then it’s okay and totally apolitical.

I will have more thoughts soon, but just wanted to clarify one aspect of your point. Is it your view that: (1) we should include a fail-safe provision but require the Delegate to disregard the OWL vote recommendation if it is contradicted by a sufficient majority of gameside voters, thus removing all discretion from the Delegate or (2) we should not include any fail-safe provision at all.

I’d prefer none, but would rather have the Assembly define the provisions for one than leave it up to the Delegate alone.