There’s no need to codify the Clerk, or grant it special powers. If the Chair wants to have a Deputy, it still can.
Totally agreed. However, I’d like to hear Jebediah elaborate on their response. Are they really a de facto deputy or this Clerk? Or an actual deputy?
I don’t really care about Jebediah’s response. It’s exceptionally obvious the Clerk is just not doing anything right now. Even if Clerk Jebediah was running the entire Assembly, it would not merit legislative establishment of the position.
I have added a provision that clarifies that the Delegate should vote as directed by the Prime Minister or, in the absence of clear direction, as prescribed by law.
Thank you. This has been adjusted.
I think any further discussion on this would depend on a discussion on how we approach regional security (see below).
I do not have a preference either way, in fact I had simply borrowed the system laid out in the current Elections Act. I have adjusted the Voting Act to reflect the use of IRV across the board.
I feel very strongly that the military is exactly like all other ministries in that it should be led by, and respond to, civilian authorities. I am not fundamentally opposed to the idea of a senior command, but the Prime Minister should as a matter of course retain final authority on military policy. Perhaps we could have a discussion and see how we could find some compromise language on this issue?
Perhaps we should have a discussion about how we see regional security and what role each government institution plays in that process. I get the impression that the current arrangement merges two roles -(i) elder figures who should lead the response to a coup or invasion, (ii) endorsement promotion and oversight- that maybe do not need to be merged.
This has been adjusted.
Much like the use of approval voting to elect the Delegate, this was copied from current law without much thought. This has been adjusted.
I mentioned this in a prior post, but I will restate that the intention, after I find a suitable language, is to remove the provision that has the Dean succeed the Chair during vacancies and keep their duties limited to presiding over the vote to elect the Chair. I want to clarify that I envision this being quite similar to an appointment vote, rather than a full election, so the Dean would play an administrative and ceremonial role rather than any policy role.
We have already had a discussion over this issue, one of the most elaborate of the entire Great Council. What way of potentially addressing this question do you feel was unaddressed in that discussion or the subsequent competing votes about possible structures for the military?
I believe that the two changes I propose here are important regardless.
If the SC are solely elder figures within the region, it is still important that they remain engaged and active enough to maintain the trust of the region. Is someone really an elder figure for the region if they are so disengaged that most members of the Assembly have never spoken to them or even seen them speak? Is someone really trusted to handle security issues if they demonstrate not a single iota of knowledge about the current security environment?
If the SC are solely endorsement holders, it is important that they actually do that, and annual “confirmation votes” by the Assembly would further serve that purpose.
Why can’t the Election Commissioner do that?
How so?
I have made it abundantly clear multiple times that civilian leadership over the military is something that as far as I’m concerned is not up for discussion. We can discuss compromise solutions where senior commanders are appointed to provide experienced leadership and support, or some other arrangement that addresses any concerns that may be had, but final authority should always remain with the Prime Minister as the elected chief executive.
I disagree that micromanaging the Security Council is important. We can outline the tasks that they should be expected to do (communicating with other branches, overseeing endorsement projects, etc.), that much is reasonable. Mandating that they elect a presiding officer, specifying who can and cannot serve as such, is an exercise in micromanagement and futility. We should give the Council its duties and allow them to determine how best to perform them.
I disagree with the concept of reconfirmation votes. If we think that we need reconfirmation votes for a position then in all likelihood legislators would not have sufficient access or knowledge to adequately judge if the official should be reconfirmed, which would turn the process into a popularity contest. If we truly want to ensure that officials stay engaged and also continue to meet their duties, then a more suitable solution would be to have appointments be for a specific term, that way those who did well and are still up to the task, as judged by whichever authority is in charge of making nominations, can be nominated for another term.
The Chair of the Assembly is the presiding officer of the legislature, elected by its own members to manage its own procedures. It is not an office elected by the region at large, so the vote should be no different, as far as the administrative aspect of it goes, than the vote held for Justice or General appointments in the sense that a debate would be held for a few days and then a vote would be opened in the Voting Floor.
No alternate proposal concedes civilian control over the military as the military remains fundamentally accountable to the Assembly and the Assembly determines the direction of what force it is authorized to use.
Nevertheless, this can be dealt with in reconciliation if needs be.
Specifying that the sitting Delegate, who is mechanically the greatest possible threat to regional security, cannot be the leader of our security body is not “micromanagement”. It’s adding a basic structural check.
This is the status quo and it is ineffective. When is the last time the CRS checked-in on the endorsement promotion activity of the Coral Guard? When is the last time the CRS directed the CG in conducting endorsement promotion events? When is the last time the CRS made a collective effort to increase their public visibility that way the current membership of the region would consider them to actually be senior and trusted members of the region in the event of a crisis? When is the last time the CRS discussed potential threats to the region’s security and how to manage them? When is the last time the CRS initiated an intelligence or counter-intelligence operation?
The CRS, by its own admission, does nothing. That’s a problem and makes it ill equipped to preempt and then address security threats as they arise.
If the SC members are supposed to be able to lead the region in the event of a crisis, then they must have credibility with the people they are leading.
In principle, I am okay with this, but in this case I foresee an issue with the italicized section, where the entity responsible for nominations is also the same entity that people are being reappointed to. I could see a version of this where people must also be reconfirmed by the Assembly accomplishing the same objective.
I see. I still object to an unaccountable and life-tenured position being created for the purpose of conducting this process.
The Assembly would exercise as much oversight over the military as it currently does over our security institutions, which is to say not at all. We are kidding ourselves if we think the Assembly would in any way exercise civilian control or oversight over the military beyond approving whoever is nominated as a general, particularly when the role of a general is sufficiently technical and skills-based that legislators would in all likelihood defer to the judgement of however made the nomination.
I have already said, more than once, that I am perfectly willing to include compromise language to provide for the appointment of senior commanders with approval from the Assembly, and I am similarly willing to work with you and others on language to clarify that the Prime Minister would not be ordinarily expected to micromanage the military, but final authority should rest with the Prime Minister as the elected chief executive, who would face elections on a regular basis where they would have to defend their policies and record before voters.
I have to wonder if we truly need a Security Council. We both agree that it does little on a day-to-day basis, and this has been the case for much of its history, so we could easily mandate reassign those security monitoring and endorsement promotion responsibilities to the executive branch. I know there will be concerns about politicising those duties but the fact remains that the people best positioned to handle them are likely to be active officials rather than semi-retired figures who, while willing to step up in times of crisis, are understandably not inclined to engage in day-to-day duties.
I am happy to consider alternatives that do not involve the election commissioner.
It took a bit longer than I intended to get around to this, but without further ado:
If I don’t mention it below, it is to be assumed I have no objections.
The Charter:
As it stands, the Charter says that the Security Council can do anything except interfere with the Assembly. In contrast, the Regional Security Act gives a longer list of actions that the Security Council may not take. This proposed change reconciles the difference in the law.
Thoughts?
Voting Act:
Defence Act:
Perhaps our formal defender status should be included within this law, it is implied by the actions that the SPSF can take, but a more explicit declaration could/should be present.
I don’t have a particular interest or stake in the outcome of the PM oversight debate. Still, I would generally prefer trying something new to “spice things up” in our regional dynamics. Perhaps an independent military would give an incentive for the Assembly to demand accountability and provide oversight to the military in the long term.
Regional Security Act:
Perhaps adding: Members of the Security Council should strive to be active and engaged members of the community so as to increase the legitimacy of the Security Council in times of regional crisis.
This provision, however, we might decide to edit it, would provide the Security Council some legitimacy in times of crisis. The whole idea is that we need to give a region to trust the Security Council. While I know each and every member of the proposed Security Council and generally trust them, that comes by virtue of my interactions with them over the years. Much of the regional population (the vast majority) is newer and doesn’t know the long-term members of the region that make up the Security Council. Why should they follow some old fossils (love yall) just because the Assembly (of perhaps 10 years ago) confirmed them to the position?
God forbid it, but if Anjo decided to coup tomorrow, I bet much of the region would be inclined to support not only the incumbent but the person that they are most easily able to interact with. Some person saying, “hey, I’m on the Security Council; please endorse me to end the coup,” might not get the intended result.
Thoughts?
Assembly Act:
I still do like the idea of sessions, and want to see them in action within the Assembly, but I think it would be better to mandate only one “mandatory” session (of indefinite length) following the election of a Chair, and allow for other sessions to be convened as the need arises. Perhaps the Prime Minister can unilaterally convene a session of the Assembly should they have a treaty/executive order/etc. to present to the Assembly and/or 10% of legislators can motion for a session to begin, followed by a quorum (majority of total registered legislators) voting to approve a session.
I am definitely open to alternative ideas, but I think this setup would be a good baseline.
Sunshine Act:
I am fine with the law as written. I can’t check at the moment, but does the Election Commissioner release the private ballots in a redacted -non-identifiable- form? Or just the raw number of private ballots received and their results?
If it is the ladder, perhaps including a provision for the election commissioner to do the former 6 months/a year after the election would be beneficial.
Not super set on this, and as I said, not sure at the moment what the redaction process actually is.
Overall, as I maintained a couple of weeks ago, I am generally pretty happy with these proposed laws.
I think this is reasonable, though I worry about leaning too much to letting the Assembly pass a law that could render states of emergency useless. I don’t know if there’s a way to strike a balance between security and the rule of law?
Thank you. This has been adjusted.
I’m not sure an independent military would incentivise the Assembly to provide oversight. I think what is most likely is that such a military would continue to work unencumbered and the Assembly would pay little attention to it under most circumstances.
I think you are absolutely right as far as your overall point goes, we do need to make sure that those expected to take charge during a security crisis are active members of the community who know, and are known by, the community at large. I’m unsure about how we get there from a legislative standpoint though. I like the idea behind your proposed language, but I wonder what would happen if, even with that provision, there is no change in how things go. I don’t know if you have any thoughts on this?
I should clarify that under the current draft the idea of “sessions” is purely ceremonial and is nothing more than a three-month period where the Assembly conducts its business, which is formally opened by an address from the Chair. This is different from the idea that had been floated a while back where legislators could “convene sessions” to discuss specific business.
I do make it a point to release release in my spreadsheet a detailed tally of how each public and private vote was cast, but that is my own thing rather than something done out of legal necessity. I’m not opposed to it, but I wonder how necessary it would be?
I suppose you could rely on the Assembly possessing the “supreme legislative authority” in the Coalition and hope that the Assembly will pass resolutions nullifying any questionable actions that the Security Council might potentially take (such as doing any of the items laid out in the Regional Security Act). This would enable you to retain the provision within the Charter about allowing Assembly business to proceed unimpeded while also axing the provisions within the Regional Security Act.
In any case, it seems that our current lack of oversight by the Assembly and lack of meaningful concern (and action) over the lack of a Minister of Defence for the last few weeks makes a rather compelling argument that as long as the SPSF isn’t acting contrary to our ideals and established laws and procedures, then they should be allowed to operate unimpeded. If such a time down the road arises where our military abuses the trust we gave them by allowing them to generally self-regulate, then the Assembly can use our “supreme legislative authority” to enforce its will upon them, i.e., recalls, reimplement PM-oversight, Assembly committee (wink wink) investigations, etc.
If members of the Security Council are not active and engaged in the community, whether it be by actively receiving and processing intelligence, participating in debate, maintaining high endorsements, being active on the RMB, assisting with the integration of new members (via being mentors and/or providing their historical accounts and experiences), etc., then they should be potentially subject to recall.
I hate how callous I make it sound because I deeply respect the contributions that everyone on the CRS has made over the years, but at some point, the CRS/Security Council will need to determine if their special status as the main line of defense in the region (and the sweeping powers we grant them) are warranted before the next generation decides for them, or worse, if a coup does it for them.
I think sessions will be of little value unless they are given more of a practical and purposeful design. Creating dynamic sessions will, in my opinion, grant the Assembly more character if it is something to look forward to. Perhaps the Assembly has been adjourned for a couple of weeks, and there is a cool and engaging discussion about creating a law to finally create a regional monetary system, and it gains traction, and the legislators bring the Assembly into session to draft the law.
Yes, it could be seen as an unnecessary step, but that’s half the fun, in my opinion.
Not too dissimilar to the idea of sessions, but when I was the Lawspeaker of Balder, I created a period of adjournment (two weeks during Christmas/New Year, a week in March, a couple of weeks throughout the Summer, etc.) where the Storting was out of session. Granted, the Storting was largely inactive, so it made it easy to implement it, but it still added character to the institution.
I think it is entirely unnecessary if, and only if, you continue to be Election Commissioner forever 
But, if you step down, I think consistent record-keeping and access to election data long-term would be beneficial to the transparency of the region.
This may be something minor, but, just for the respect of the former institution, why not the administrative team on the Regional Message Board be called the Local Council?
It would make it seem more like if nothing happened on there.
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I asked this a while ago too but back on the old forums. You can call the new body whatever you want. Our laws don’t need to mention the “official” name of the body. Call it the Local Council, call it the moderation team or whatever.
I’d prefer LM, local mod if push comes to shove. LC would imply something electable, and the more low key we keep it, the more people could be enticed into look into other aspects that are electable.
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I’d like to bump this discussion a bit, particularly regarding the role of the Security Council/CRS, ideally from current members of the CRS that haven’t spoken yet.
I would also like to try and motion this omnibus Charter and law set to vote in the coming days.
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So, are we still intending on having the office of the Dean of the Assembly, or has this proposal been dismissed?
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I’m still for it. It’s a neat little formality.
I don’t mind, had just lost track and was wondering.
Honestly, I don’t get that argument. We’d be creating, as HumanSanity put it, an “unaccountable and life-tenured position” and doing that for the sake of a neat little formality seems like a strange choice of priorities to me.
Why is the position of the Dean just a neat little formality? I personally believe elections for the Chair of the Assembly, or even performing the duties of the Chair of the Assembly, aren’t just small formalities but rather are important parts of our governmental system.
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Bump.