Amendment to the Regional Officers Act

Assembly
1

While perusing the Regional Officers Act in the course of another debate, I noticed what I’d consider a significant flaw in Section 4.

Despite generally trusting our Delegates, I think this is a poor clause to have. It gives rise to a situation where the Prime Minister and Delegate could disagree, and the Delegate could effectively overrule the Prime Minister. Given the law otherwise gives the PM extreme deference on regional officers, I think the logical fix here is to remove the Delegate’s ability to make determinations on “unbecoming” behavior for removals.

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Regional Officers Act
[A2604.07] Amendment to the Regional Officers Act
Amendment to the Regional Communications Act
Amendments to the Border Control Act (Moderator Powers)
2

Though it is a bit of an edgecase (I’m curious when the last time this clause was used?), this is a decent change before it could ever come up. Support.

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3

that’s fine, I’m supportive.

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4

Full support.

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5

huh

6

I can’t think of a recent time, but what I can say is that if I was a rogue/coup Delegate trying to retain some measure/perception of legitimacy, this clause as-written would probably be one of the things in my toolbox.

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I’m not strictly opposed… but I think we are trying to solve a problem that doesn’t and has never existed.

It really doesn’t… It mentions that the PM gets all non-BC powers and that they get three RO Cabinet slots.

Beyond that, it states that the PM and the Delegate may appoint ROs at their discretion.

This amendment assumes the primary risk is the Delegate misusing authority. In practice, the higher-risk scenario is a Regional Officer abusing power in the short window before the proposed remedy (the PM) can respond. If the Delegate is online and the PM is not (or not active in-game), it is absolutely in the region’s best interest for the Delegate to act rather than wait for the PM to come online and issue an order. It is, ironically, more likely that a Cabinet RO will abuse their powers, as I warned a few of them during my time as Delegate (it didn’t result in the removal of their powers, but I still had to make a correction).

Even under the scenario it targets, its effect is limited. If the Prime Minister or Council on Regional Security issues a lawful counter-order and the Delegate ignores it, we are already in a constitutional crisis anyway. No one would be arguing over semantics on whether the Delegate was trying to maintain some semblance of legitimacy. This amendment doesn’t prevent that outcome; it just rearranges who can act beforehand.

More broadly, it further divorces the reality of how the in-game mechanics function and how the RO Act provides necessary checks on the Delegate without being cumbersome. That balance works because the Delegate is entrusted to execute within that framework. Adding too many variations to the RO Act that don’t align with how in-game mechanics actually operate doesn’t improve oversight; it just makes enforcement slower and more cumbersome.

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8

Arguably, having any government not set by the sitting Delegate is “divorced from the reality of how the in-game mechanics function.” You may say that is an extreme, but it’s not an uncommon opinion abroad. Your argument in this regard is moot, as the South Pacific’s laws clearly intend the organizing of the government to rest with the Prime Minister. This is no more divorced from game mechanics than the Prime Minister issuing orders on officer appointments, which rely on the Delegate’s compliance.

The damage a regional officer without border control (which would be the case if a Cabinet member went “rogue”) is minimal compared to the risks associated with the Delegate being able to dismiss officers at will. At most they can temporarily vandalize the region.

That the Delegate can presently order the dismissal of a Cabinet official from an officer spot at their own discretion seems like a clear oversight, and not the intention behind the law whatsoever. Can the Prime Minister reappoint them? The Delegate re-dismiss them for the previous allegedly unbecoming behavior? It is an obvious conflict to allow both roles this sweeping discretion.

You imply the law affords equal deference to the Prime Minister and Delegate on the subject of regional officers. This is errenous. While the Delegate can appoint “members” with certain permissions, this is an additional quirk after the other alloted roles. The Prime Minister is legally entitled to three ministers (which means four potential Cabinet officers including themselves), the Council on Regional Security another three, and the RMB moderation apparatus up to five. 4 + 3 + 5 = 12, which is the limit allowed by the site mechanics you attempt to lean on above. In other words, where the Prime Minister and CRS have specific allocations, the Delegate does not, and can, legally, be shut out from appointing officers if the others use their availability entirely.

I would be okay with altering the amendment to specify the Prime Minister can order the dismissal of Cabinet officers, and the CRS the others, if we feel it necessary. However your arguments on the anglings of the law are largely without merit. Your vague point that the problem has “never existed” is also an insufficient reason to avoid patching holes in the legal system.

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9

But other parts of our structure have changed down the years, such as the Cabinet elections, they are now nominated by the Prime Minister and affirmed by the Assembly. There was once a time our Delegate was both Head of State and Head of Government, now the Prime Minister is the Head of Government. If we have separated the Head of Government from the Head of State, it is reasonable to remove the appointment of ROs from the Delegate.

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No. In the status quo, we’d have a constitutional crisis because there’s ambiguity on who has the final say/authority. If we pass this amendment, the Delegate will legally have to follow the PM’s directive. And, if they don’t, then there will be no ambiguity about the fact that they are in violation of the law and it wouldn’t be a constitutional crisis, rather a rogue-Delegate-probably-couping crisis. But at least we’ll know what it is.

When it comes to the Delegate’s exercising of in-game authority on behalf of other portions of the government, we want things to be as clear as possible, precisely so that we can avoid a constitutional crisis.

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11

I support the amendment

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To expand on HumanSanity’s point – people definitely would. A major point of the 2016 “constitutional crsis” was the government arguing their actions were legal and/or justified.

On top of that, the perceived legitimacy of the Delegate is extremely important to how a rogue Delegate is viewed by foreign regions who might involve themselves. Not every coup is going to be as open as “I am couping the government and making it a colony of [raider UCR].” A rogue Delegate is likely to argue some legitimate basis in their behavior… just like… the last time a Delegate went rogue in this region.

13

This feels more like the crux of the issue to me? I don’t have a problem with the Delegate getting to remove a Regional Officer that they themselves appointed.

That said, I don’t really mind just cutting out the situation where both the Delegate and the Prime Minister want to appoint someone as a Regional Officer and then we’d have to figure out who could theoretically remove them.

14

I agree with this. It’s not apparent to me why the Delegate has discretion to appoint regional officers in the first place. I would support expanding this amendment to remove that authority.

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15

I agree, I was gonna say I don’t like the idea of letting the Delegate appoint/remove RO’s in the first place.

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Here is a revised set of amendments in line with that point.

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17

I think, if those officials can’t actually grant RO powers, perhaps it should be clarified that what they do is order the assignment and that the Delegate must comply.

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18

At this point, if the goal is to eliminate the Delegate’s discretionary authority for the sake of clarity, we may as well be consistent about it. The Delegate can currently eject or ban nations immediately under the Border Control framework to deal with spammers, trolls, or update-window risks, which is a far more direct and consequential use of in-game power than officer appointments. Likewise, they can unilaterally update the WFE, control the welcome telegram, send mass Telegrams, and manage polls, all of which have immediate, visible impact on the region.

So if discretionary authority is inherently a problem, those powers would logically fall under the same scrutiny. Otherwise, we’re drawing a line that removes lower-impact discretion while leaving the highest-impact forms untouched, which undercuts the rationale for this change.

More to the point, the underlying concern here seems to be that the Prime Minister and Delegate might disagree and the Delegate would “win” by virtue of mechanics. In practice, that has never happened, and there’s no real reason to think it will. The precedent of Prime Ministerial supremacy in directing the government is well established, and any Delegate openly defying that would be stepping into a political crisis they would almost certainly lose. The Assembly can recall a Delegate, and a lawful order from the Prime Minister is still binding regardless. This isn’t a gap in authority, it’s a question of compliance, which legislation doesn’t meaningfully solve.

If the concern here is oversight or clarity, there are more targeted ways to address that without removing the Delegate’s ability to act in real time. For example, we could mirror the Border Control framework by requiring the Delegate to inform after taking action, or consult beforehand where practical. Alternatively, if the issue is ambiguity, we could explicitly clarify that lawful directives from the Prime Minister or Council on Regional Security are binding.

Both approaches improve accountability and clarity while preserving responsiveness, which is where the actual risk lies. By contrast, removing discretion entirely addresses a theoretical concern at the cost of making the system slower in practice.

Obviously, I don’t think we should go down the road of stripping all discretionary powers. But it illustrates the broader point: some level of immediate, unilateral action by the Delegate isn’t an oversight, it’s a necessity dictated by how the mechanics actually function. The system relies on that responsiveness, with legal and political checks applied after the fact. This amendment chips away at that responsiveness in one area without addressing why it exists in the first place.

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Uh, I was thinking more that if the Delegate and the Prime Minister both want to appoint someone as a Regional Officer then it should count as the Prime Minister’s appointment (and their prerogative to remove), but I guess that’s one way of going about it.

Only if they’re low-influence? I don’t think it’s inconsistent to believe that the Delegate should have some degree of discretionary authority in some areas but that there should also be limits — I think that’s true of other positions too.

I am not sure this is true — for instance if there’s a free Regional Officer slot and the Delegate, Prime Minister and CRS all want to appoint someone, I don’t think the Regional Officers act actually specifies any order of priority. But I think that’s a separate issue than the one Quebec initially raised, which was also about who has the authority to remove Regional Officers, not who has to comply with that authority.

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For spammers and trolls, yes. But the BC Act grants considerable leeway and discretion to the Delegate in the hypothetical and unlikely instance that there is an invasion/coup occurring. For me, it seems rather obvious that discretion is much more dangerous than an equally hypothetical and unlikely event where the PM and Delegate disagree on who to appoint or what constitutes unbecoming behavior. PM supremacy over the Delegate is very well established.

Having treated the RO Act as my bible for two years, I can attest that, beyond the statutory maximums for specific named and quantified appointments, the CRS is given preference for all remaining spots to be filled. It just so happens that the CRS has often been double dipping in terms of RO access (being PM/Cabinet/etc. RO as well) and the need for that preference never arose.

As far as the Delegate and Prime Minister potentially appointing competing ROs, it hasn’t been until recently that the PM began exercising that discretion in the form of RMB mayor (to which the last few Delegates have not opposed or given any indication that they did oppose it). Previously, if there was a spot, it was the Delegate’s to give if no one claimed it. In the seldom instances where the PM did want to make an appointment, it was a simple coordination/Discord message to make it happen (PM supremacy is an ingrained thing in regional culture). The system is working just fine and as intended, and there is no indication from any source other than a hypothetical and unlikely scenario that there is an issue. This is a simple case of over-legislating a problem that doesn’t exist and is unlikely to ever exist.