[2421.AB] Military Code Reform

[Banexet]

This bill attempts to update the Military Code to better conform with the state of defending today.
Edit: Added clarification that the dishonorable discharge from engaging on the opposing side of an R/D conflict only applies to defensive operations undergone by the military.

Amendment to the Military Code:

1. Admiralty

…

(3) In case of a vacancy on the Admiralty, the Prime Minister may appoint a Captain with approval by the Assembly to become an Admiral. Should there be no Admirals, the military shall not operate except for the self-defense of the South Pacific, for the defense of an ally, or for the purposes of explicit treaty obligations.
…

3. Rules

(1) A member of the military must show respectful behavior towards a superior, must not bully, humiliate, or intimidate their subordinates, and must not act in an unbecoming manner toward their peers.

(2) A member of the military may not intentionally or recklessly disobey a lawful command given by a superior, or intentionally or recklessly put at risk, delay, or otherwise disrupt a lawful operation.

(3) A member of the military may only be a member of another military with assent of the Admiralty, which it may rescind at any time and for any reason. If the member’s other military is on the opposing side of an arbitrary R/D conflict defensive operation undergone by the military, the member may not change sides for the duration of the operation, and shall be considered suspended from the military for the duration of the operation should they be engaged on the opposing side shall immediately be dishonorably discharged from the military.

(4) A member of the military must not aid the enemy. A member who is also a member of another military and engaged alongside that military on the opposing side during an arbitrary R/D conflict shall not be considered in conflict of this rule.

(5) A member of the military may not obtain or attempt to obtain confidential information with the intent to disclose it to individuals or organizations not authorized to possess it.

(6) A member of the military is required to perform at least one mission every calendar month, unless suspended or granted leave by the Admiralty.

(7) (6) The Admiralty may instate additional rules that do not contradict rules stated here at its discretion. These rules must be publicly visible.

…

4. Disciplinary Actions

…

(2) A disciplinary action given to a member of the military can be any one of:

1. Temporary demotion, in which the affected member must serve under a lower effective rank for a duration of up to one month;
2. Indefinite demotion, in which the affected member’s effective rank is indefinitely lowered by virtue of no longer meeting rank requirements;
3. Suspension, in which the affected member may not serve the military for a duration of up to one month;
   d. Honorable discharge, in which the affected member is dismissed of duty in good faith;
   e. d. Dishonorable discharge, in which the affected member is dismissed of duty and not permitted to return without special assent of the Assembly.

Draft 5

Amendment to the Military Code:

1. Admiralty

…

(3) In case of a vacancy on the Admiralty, the Prime Minister may appoint a Captain with approval by the Assembly to become an Admiral. Should there be no Admirals, the military shall not operate except for the self-defense of the South Pacific, for the defense of an ally, or for the purposes of explicit treaty obligations.
…

3. Rules

(1) A member of the military must show respectful behavior towards a superior, must not bully, humiliate, or intimidate their subordinates, and must not act in an unbecoming manner toward their peers.

(2) A member of the military may not intentionally or recklessly disobey a lawful command given by a superior, or intentionally or recklessly put at risk, delay, or otherwise disrupt a lawful operation.

(3) A member of the military may only be a member of another military with assent of the Admiralty, which it may rescind at any time and for any reason. If the member’s other military is on the opposing side of an arbitrary R/D conflict, the member may not change sides for the duration of the operation, and shall be considered suspended from the military for the duration of the operation should they be engaged on the opposing side shall immediately be dishonorably discharged from the military.

(4) A member of the military must not aid the enemy. A member who is also a member of another military and engaged alongside that military on the opposing side during an arbitrary R/D conflict shall not be considered in conflict of this rule.

(5) A member of the military may not obtain or attempt to obtain confidential information with the intent to disclose it to individuals or organizations not authorized to possess it.

(6) A member of the military is required to perform at least one mission every calendar month, unless suspended or granted leave by the Admiralty.

(7) (6) The Admiralty may instate additional rules that do not contradict rules stated here at its discretion. These rules must be publicly visible.

…

4. Disciplinary Actions

…

(2) A disciplinary action given to a member of the military can be any one of:

1. Temporary demotion, in which the affected member must serve under a lower effective rank for a duration of up to one month;
2. Indefinite demotion, in which the affected member’s effective rank is indefinitely lowered by virtue of no longer meeting rank requirements;
3. Suspension, in which the affected member may not serve the military for a duration of up to one month;
   d. Honorable discharge, in which the affected member is dismissed of duty in good faith;
   e. d. Dishonorable discharge, in which the affected member is dismissed of duty and not permitted to return without special assent of the Assembly.

Draft 4

Amendment to the Military Code:

…

3. Rules

(1) A member of the military must show respectful behavior towards a superior, must not bully, humiliate, or intimidate their subordinates, and must not act in an unbecoming manner toward their peers.

(2) A member of the military may not intentionally or recklessly disobey a lawful command given by a superior, or intentionally or recklessly put at risk, delay, or otherwise disrupt a lawful operation.

(3) A member of the military may only be a member of another military with assent of the Admiralty, which it may rescind at any time and for any reason. If the member’s other military is on the opposing side of an arbitrary R/D conflict, the member may not change sides for the duration of the operation, and shall be considered suspended from the military for the duration of the operation should they be engaged on the opposing side shall immediately be dishonorably discharged from the military.

(4) A member of the military must not aid the enemy. A member who is also a member of another military and engaged alongside that military on the opposing side during an arbitrary R/D conflict shall not be considered in conflict of this rule.

(5) A member of the military may not obtain or attempt to obtain confidential information with the intent to disclose it to individuals or organizations not authorized to possess it.

(6) A member of the military is required to perform at least one mission every calendar month, unless suspended or granted leave by the Admiralty.

(7) (6) The Admiralty may instate additional rules that do not contradict rules stated here at its discretion. These rules must be publicly visible.

…

4. Disciplinary Actions

…

(2) A disciplinary action given to a member of the military can be any one of:

1. Temporary demotion, in which the affected member must serve under a lower effective rank for a duration of up to one month;
2. Indefinite demotion, in which the affected member’s effective rank is indefinitely lowered by virtue of no longer meeting rank requirements;
3. Suspension, in which the affected member may not serve the military for a duration of up to one month;
   d. Honorable discharge, in which the affected member is dismissed of duty in good faith;
   e. d. Dishonorable discharge, in which the affected member is dismissed of duty and not permitted to return without special assent of the Assembly.

Draft 3

Amendment to the Charter:

X. THE MILITARY

…

(2) The military will be led by the Prime Minister, along with a board of admirals appointed by the Prime Minister and approved by the Assembly, of which the Prime Minister or their appointed designee is a member. Any other admirals must be appointed by the Prime Minister and approved by the Assembly. The Prime Minister and Admiralty may establish further hierarchy, create programs, and appoint deputies as they see necessary.

(3) The military will have the support of the Coalition in conducting operations to protect innocent regions from attack and oppression and promote legitimate, native democratic institutions across the world. The military may not colonize or annex any region without the express permission of the Prime Minister and a majority vote of the Assembly. Nor may the military attack, subjugate, purge, destroy, or vandalize any regions, excepting those regions which espouse hateful ideologies and those regions against which the Coalition has declared an official state of war.

(4) The Prime Minister will ensure that no military activities harm the government’s diplomatic affairs or public relations.

Amendment to the Military Code:

…

2. Ranks

…

(4) An Admiral is removed from the Admiralty if

1. the Admiral no longer holds the rank of Captain (temporary demotions shall not be considered for this purpose), with the exception of the Prime Minister or their appointed designee,
2. a simple majority of the Admiralty votes for the removal, or
3. the Admiral is recalled by the Assembly through regular order.

…

3. Rules

(1) A member of the military must show respectful behavior towards a superior, must not bully, humiliate, or intimidate their subordinates, and must not act in an unbecoming manner toward their peers.

(2) A member of the military may not intentionally or recklessly disobey a lawful command given by a superior, or intentionally or recklessly put at risk, delay, or otherwise disrupt a lawful operation.

(3) A member of the military may only be a member of another military with assent of the Admiralty, which it may rescind at any time and for any reason. If the member’s other military is on the opposing side of an arbitrary R/D conflict, the member may not change sides for the duration of the operation, and shall be considered suspended from the military for the duration of the operation should they be engaged on the opposing side shall immediately be dishonorably discharged from the military.

(4) A member of the military must not aid the enemy. A member who is also a member of another military and engaged alongside that military on the opposing side during an arbitrary R/D conflict shall not be considered in conflict of this rule.

(5) A member of the military may not obtain or attempt to obtain confidential information with the intent to disclose it to individuals or organizations not authorized to possess it.

(6) A member of the military is required to perform at least one mission every calendar month, unless suspended or granted leave by the Admiralty.

(7) (6) The Admiralty may instate additional rules that do not contradict rules stated here at its discretion. These rules must be publicly visible.

…

4. Disciplinary Actions

…

(2) A disciplinary action given to a member of the military can be any one of:

1. Temporary demotion, in which the affected member must serve under a lower effective rank for a duration of up to one month;
2. Indefinite demotion, in which the affected member’s effective rank is indefinitely lowered by virtue of no longer meeting rank requirements;
3. Suspension, in which the affected member may not serve the military for a duration of up to one month;
   d. Honorable discharge, in which the affected member is dismissed of duty in good faith;
   e. d. Dishonorable discharge, in which the affected member is dismissed of duty and not permitted to return without special assent of the Assembly.

Draft 2

Amendment to the Charter:

X. THE MILITARY

…

(2) The military will be led by the Prime Minister, along with a board of admirals appointed by the Prime Minister and approved by the Assembly, of which the Prime Minister or their appointed designee is a member. Any other admirals must be appointed by the Prime Minister and approved by the Assembly. The Prime Minister and Admiralty may establish further hierarchy, create programs, and appoint deputies as they see necessary.

(3) The military will have the support of the Coalition in conducting operations to protect innocent regions from attack and oppression and promote legitimate, native democratic institutions across the world. The military may not colonize or annex any region without the express permission of the Prime Minister Admiralty and a majority vote of the Assembly. Nor may the military attack, subjugate, purge, destroy, or vandalize any regions, excepting those regions which espouse hateful ideologies and those regions against which the Coalition has declared an official state of war.

(4) The Prime Minister Admiralty will ensure that no military activities harm the government’s diplomatic affairs or public relations.

Amendment to the Military Code:

…

2. Ranks

…

(4) An Admiral is removed from the Admiralty if

1. the Admiral no longer holds the rank of Captain (temporary demotions shall not be considered for this purpose), with the exception of the Prime Minister or their appointed designee,
2. a simple majority of the Admiralty votes for the removal, or
3. the Admiral is recalled by the Assembly through regular order.

…

3. Rules

(1) A member of the military must show respectful behavior towards a superior, must not bully, humiliate, or intimidate their subordinates, and must not act in an unbecoming manner toward their peers.

(2) A member of the military may not intentionally or recklessly disobey a lawful command given by a superior, or intentionally or recklessly put at risk, delay, or otherwise disrupt a lawful operation.

(3) A member of the military may only be a member of another military with assent of the Admiralty, which it may rescind at any time and for any reason. If the member’s other military is on the opposing side of an arbitrary R/D conflict, the member may not change sides for the duration of the operation, and shall be considered suspended from the military for the duration of the operation should they be engaged on the opposing side shall immediately be dishonorably discharged from the military.

(4) A member of the military must not aid the enemy. A member who is also a member of another military and engaged alongside that military on the opposing side during an arbitrary R/D conflict shall not be considered in conflict of this rule.

(5) A member of the military may not obtain or attempt to obtain confidential information with the intent to disclose it to individuals or organizations not authorized to possess it.

(6) A member of the military is required to perform at least one mission every calendar month, unless suspended or granted leave by the Admiralty.

(7) (6) The Admiralty may instate additional rules that do not contradict rules stated here at its discretion. These rules must be publicly visible.

…

4. Disciplinary Actions

…

(2) A disciplinary action given to a member of the military can be any one of:

1. Temporary demotion, in which the affected member must serve under a lower effective rank for a duration of up to one month;
2. Indefinite demotion, in which the affected member’s effective rank is indefinitely lowered by virtue of no longer meeting rank requirements;
3. Suspension, in which the affected member may not serve the military for a duration of up to one month;
   d. Honorable discharge, in which the affected member is dismissed of duty in good faith;
   e. d. Dishonorable discharge, in which the affected member is dismissed of duty and not permitted to return without special assent of the Assembly.

Draft 1

Amendment to the Charter:

…

V. THE EXECUTIVE

(1) The Prime Minister is the head of government and the leader of the executive branch. They will be responsible for implementing their electoral mandate, being a liaison between the government and the community, interacting with foreign regions and organizations, directing the regional military, filling appointed positions within the government, promoting regional culture, overseeing the Coalition’s interest in World Assembly matters, integrating new members into the community, and defending the Coalition’s interests.

…

X. THE MILITARY

…

(2) The military will be led by the Prime Minister, along with a board of admirals appointed by the Prime Minister and approved by the Assembly, of which the Prime Minister or their appointed designee is a member. Any other admirals must be appointed by the Prime Minister and approved by the Assembly. The Prime Minister and Admiralty may establish further hierarchy, create programs, and appoint deputies as they see necessary.

(3) The military will have the support of the Coalition in conducting operations to protect innocent regions from attack and oppression and promote legitimate, native democratic institutions across the world. The military may not colonize or annex any region without the express permission of the Prime Minister Admiralty and a majority vote of the Assembly. Nor may the military attack, subjugate, purge, destroy, or vandalize any regions, excepting those regions which espouse hateful ideologies and those regions against which the Coalition has declared an official state of war.

(4) The Prime Minister Admiralty will ensure that no military activities harm the government’s diplomatic affairs or public relations.

Amendment to the Military Code:

…

2. Ranks

…

(4) An Admiral is removed from the Admiralty if

1. the Admiral no longer holds the rank of Captain (temporary demotions shall not be considered for this purpose), with the exception of the Prime Minister or their appointed designee,
2. a simple majority of the Admiralty votes for the removal, or
3. the Admiral is recalled by the Assembly through regular order.

…

3. Rules

(1) A member of the military must show respectful behavior towards a superior, must not bully, humiliate, or intimidate their subordinates, and must not act in an unbecoming manner toward their peers.

(2) A member of the military may not intentionally or recklessly disobey a lawful command given by a superior, or intentionally or recklessly put at risk, delay, or otherwise disrupt a lawful operation.

(3) A member of the military may only be a member of another military with assent of the Admiralty, which it may rescind at any time and for any reason. If the member’s other military is on the opposing side of an arbitrary R/D conflict, the member may not change sides for the duration of the operation, and shall be considered suspended from the military for the duration of the operation should they be engaged on the opposing side shall immediately be dishonorably discharged from the military.

(4) A member of the military must not aid the enemy. A member who is also a member of another military and engaged alongside that military on the opposing side during an arbitrary R/D conflict shall not be considered in conflict of this rule.

(5) A member of the military may not obtain or attempt to obtain confidential information with the intent to disclose it to individuals or organizations not authorized to possess it.

(6) A member of the military is required to perform at least one mission every calendar month, unless suspended or granted leave by the Admiralty.

(7) (6) The Admiralty may instate additional rules that do not contradict rules stated here at its discretion. These rules must be publicly visible.

…

4. Disciplinary Actions

…

(2) A disciplinary action given to a member of the military can be any one of:

1. Temporary demotion, in which the affected member must serve under a lower effective rank for a duration of up to one month;
2. Indefinite demotion, in which the affected member’s effective rank is indefinitely lowered by virtue of no longer meeting rank requirements;
3. Suspension, in which the affected member may not serve the military for a duration of up to one month;
   d. Honorable discharge, in which the affected member is dismissed of duty in good faith;
   e. d. Dishonorable discharge, in which the affected member is dismissed of duty and not permitted to return without special assent of the Assembly.

[ProfessorHenn]

Why is the Prime Minister removed from making decisions about the military they lead?

[Banexet]

The military is lead by the Admiralty, of which the PM or their appointed designee (MoD) is a member. This has been the case for a long time, and this bill clarifies this fact.

[Banexet]

Upon further consideration, removed the change to Part V of the Charter.

[ProfessorHenn]

Then hard against.

Admirals are appointed by the PM because they (hopefully) have the experience and knowledge in military operations to be able to lead and advise on them. A democracy doesn’t relinquish control of the military to unelected officials.

[Pronoun]

@ProfessorHenn

Admirals are appointed by the PM

…and they still would be?

In the current system, the PM or their appointed deputy is a member of the Admiralty but not an Admiral. I’m not sure what purpose that distinction serves or how making it so that the PM or their appointed deputy is also an Admiral constitutes removing control from elected government…?

[Banexet]

They still would be, this just clarifies what we already have. You wouldn’t say that SCOTUS is controlled by the President, for example.

[lordnwahs]

Any reason in particular that honorable discharge is removed?

[ProfessorHenn]

And for those that oppose “what we already have”?

[ProfessorHenn]

@Pronoun

I’m not sure what purpose that distinction serves or how making it so that the PM or their appointed deputy is also an Admiral constitutes removing control from elected government…?

That was the status quo that came out of the last Great Council because we were at each other’s throats so much that a compromise became impossible. Either the PM exercises the control that they should have over the military, as befitting a true democracy, or we relinquish a huge portion of our foreign policy to external interests because we have defined ourselves as defenders and R/D is not currently a public venue that our citizens can question the validity and legitimacy of operations that are undertaken. Admirals aren’t subject to anything but recall attempts. PM’s have to face the music on a regular cycle, at least.

[Banexet]

Why would you discipline someone by honorably discharging them? If discipline is needed to the point where someone needs to be kicked out of the military the discharge should definitely be dishonorable.

[Pronoun]

@ProfessorHenn

That was the status quo that came out of the last Great Council because we were at each other’s throats so much that a compromise became impossible.

I mean, since we’re apparently picking bones here — we had a dual vote, in which a proposed PM-led military failed with 57% against, and a General Corps-led military passed with 79% in favor. I can’t read other people’s minds and don’t know if compromise was ever possible, but I mean, it seems like 79% wasn’t enough to make it happen ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

To be clear, my position hasn’t changed all that much; I still don’t mind, in principle, a PM-led military. I did mind having no military, because, frankly, it’s fun! People should participate in our military! But I also just can’t agree with some of the arguments you’re making

@ProfessorHenn

the PM exercises the control that they should have over the military, as befitting a true democracy, or we relinquish a huge portion of our foreign policy to external interests

Okay, there’s a lot to unpack here.

• I can sympathize to an extent with the concerns about control over foreign policy, though it seems like for different reasons than the ones you’ve laid out. For instance, I’m not really sure why the Admiralty as a whole should be concerned about our diplomatic affairs — it seems nominally good for our Admirals to consider that, but ultimately our diplomatic affairs are the responsibility of the PM.
• That said, I don’t follow where your concern about ‘external interests’ and don’t grok how that’s related to the structure of our military leadership. What external interests are you referring to? Other defenders? The ones we, the Assembly, chose to declare our alignment with? The ones we, the Assembly, chose to ratify treaties with? In any case, our Admirals are not external interests, they are South Pacificans — and in fact, ones who must be approved by the Assembly to take their positions.
• I’m not really sure what ‘befitting a true democracy’ is supposed to mean other than the same arguments I genuinely didn’t follow last time — civilian control of the military sounds nice, but NS militaries can’t drive their tanks into the capital and hold up the Delegate at gunpoint and cancel democratic elections and prop up a junta. I get the idea that the military should be subordinate to civil society. But you know who we let remain unelected? The people who can declare individuals to be hostile and ban them from the region, the people who can deny the right to vote, and the people who are next in line for the Delegacy in terms of game mechanics and would have the most influence to burn — they’re all unelected. (That last one on the list doesn’t even need Assembly approval!)

@ProfessorHenn

R/D is not currently a public venue that our citizens can question the validity and legitimacy of operations that are undertaken

It’s not? I said this the last time we had this discussion, but our military has literally published over 1,500 reports on every single operation it’s conducted. Frankly, that’s more than some of our elected officials have put out!

[Welly]

I am opposed to these amendments, largely for the reasons laid out by ProfessorHenn. I won’t go on at great length, as I am wont to do, but I did want to offer a response to some of the points that have been made.

@Banexet

Upon further consideration, removed the change to Part V of the Charter.

In principle I support this change, as it retains a semblance of democratic / civilian control over the military. But keeping this provision makes the proposal as a whole incoherent–It retains the PM’s responsibility for “directing the regional military,” while severely curtailing the PM’s authority to actually do so. In other words, the PM is given a responsibility for which they will be held accountable by the voters, but not given sufficient authority to execute that responsibility. Under this proposal, if the PM and Admirals disagree on strategy, then the PM could end up outvoted and thus with no practical say on the direction of the regional military, but still be held ultimately responsible for that direction.

@Banexet

They still would be, this just clarifies what we already have. You wouldn’t say that SCOTUS is controlled by the President, for example.

This analogy cuts the other way. It’s true that SCOTUS is not controlled by the President, but the US military is. The difference is attributable to the fundamentally different roles that those two institutions play in the American system of government.

The Supreme Court is not supposed to be making policy or value judgments (putting aside whether they do–almost everyone agrees that they shouldn’t). The Court is insulated from democratic control to ensure that they are able to neutrally decide cases free from political pressure. The Court does not decide those cases based on what it believes to be good policy–it simply applies preexisting law.

In contrast, the military can be a policymaking tool. How the United States (or any country) deploys its military is a policy choice that is often freighted with value judgments. It is for that reason that the President does control the military. Not at the tactical or operational level, of course; those decisions are left to the expert judgment of military officials. But at the strategic level, military policy is ultimately directed by democratically accountable civilians–the President and the Secretary of Defense. So it’s true that the President appoints top military officers in the same way that they appoint Supreme Court Justices. But unlike SCOTUS, the President retains authority over those officers via the Commander-in-Chief clause.

@Pronoun

I’m not really sure why the Admiralty as a whole should be concerned about our diplomatic affairs — it seems nominally good for our Admirals to consider that, but ultimately our diplomatic affairs are the responsibility of the PM.

I fully agree with this point, but to me it weighs against this proposal. It seems likely that the deployment our military could influence, affect, or impact our diplomatic affairs, which we agree are the ultimate responsibility of the PM. Under this proposal, however, the PM is still charged with managing our diplomatic affairs but is severely limited in their ability to direct an instrumentality–the military–that can affect those very same affairs. In other words, the Admirals can deploy the military in a way that the PM believes is detrimental to our foreign relations, and there is effectively nothing the PM can do about it if they are outvoted on the Admiralty. Yes, the PM could ask the Assembly to recall the Admirals. But, in addition to being a drastic action and an undesirably blunt all-or-nothing tool, it’s a somewhat awkward solution. For one thing, the Admirals could plausibly defend themselves before the Assembly by taking the exact position you propose–we have done nothing wrong; of course we didn’t consider diplomatic affairs in making our decisions, that’s the PM’s job, not ours! Plus, the PM has been elected by the citizenry to implement their vision for FA. Why should they have to get the Assembly to back a recall vote (or votes) if the Admirals appointed by their predecessors disagree with and/ or don’t care about that vision?

@Pronoun

I’m not really sure what ‘befitting a true democracy’ is supposed to mean other than the same arguments I genuinely didn’t follow last time — civilian control of the military sounds nice, but NS militaries can’t drive their tanks into the capital and hold up the Delegate at gunpoint and cancel democratic elections and prop up a junta. I get the idea that the military should be subordinate to civil society. But you know who we let remain unelected? The people who can declare individuals to be hostile and ban them from the region, the people who can deny the right to vote, and the people who are next in line for the Delegacy in terms of game mechanics and would have the most influence to burn — they’re all unelected. (That last one on the list doesn’t even need Assembly approval!)

I of course agree that the stakes of military action are incalculably lower in NS than RL, given that NS militaries cannot physically hurt real people. But they can do the in-game equivalent of much else that RL militaries do–isn’t that what the entire R/D architecture is built around? An NS military can invade a region, can displace the elected government, can stage a coup of a Delegacy, can prop up an allied regime, etc. Again, I realize no one will be physically hurt, but that’s because this is a game. R/D military action itself is the game’s equivalent of the RL use of military force, complete with consequences for international affairs and regional governments. I don’t fully understand why that use of force should not be subject to democratic control in a similar way that it is in RL.

The other unelected bodies you mention seem distinguishable. First, most of their powers are carefully circumscribed by law and their exercise is subject to judicial review for compliance with those laws. I am not aware of military actions being subject to judicial review, and I would not support such a system. As for those powers that are less stringently regulated / seem more plenary (e.g., the CRS’ emergency powers), they are limited to specific, dire, rare situations. To say that democratic control can be limited in such highly unusual circumstances strikes me as quite different than applying similar limitations to the ongoing and continuous conduct of our regional military.

[Pronoun]

@Welly

It retains the PM’s responsibility for “directing the regional military,” while severely curtailing the PM’s authority to actually do so.

How so? I would think it increases the PM’s authority, by ensuring that the PM is not only a member of the Admiralty, but also an Admiral themselves.

@Welly

I fully agree with this point, but to me it weighs against this proposal.

Yes, that was my point. But that’s also, like, two lines of the amendment. I think a lot of the rest is just cleaning up old cruft and has little to do with the structure of military leadership.

---

To be honest, I was going to write out a much longer response, but I don’t think it’s actually relevant to the proposed amendment. I think the changes to Charter X(3) and X(4) can go, but other than that, I really can’t see how this amendment reduces the PM’s powers.

[Welly]

@Pronoun

How so? I would think it increases the PM’s authority, by ensuring that the PM is not only a member of the Admiralty, but also an Admiral themselves.

I see two ways in which this reduces the PM’s authority over the military:

1. It eliminates the express provision that “the military will be led by the Prime Minister.” Instead, it indicates that the Admiralty will ultimately lead the military, and the PM’s power will be limited to being a member of that body and appointing members should vacancies arise.
2. The changes to Charter X. (3) and X. (4) expressly curtail the PM’s control over military activities in favor of the Admiralty. I realize now we agree on cutting those changes, but just being comprehensive here.

To be sure, under this proposal it is possible that the PM could have complete control over the military. If no other Admirals are currently serving, then the PM would be the only member of the Admiralty–the body this proposal charges with “le[ading]” the military–and would be under no obligation to appoint any Admirals. In other words, the PM’s authority over the military will fluctuate depending on the number of Admirals that their predecessors have appointed and whether / when those Admirals choose to resign. The PM might have complete control over the admiralty, and thus the military, or they might be only one vote on a four member board. I do not see the value in such a system, where the extent of the PM’s authority over the military can vary substantially from term to term based largely on events outside of the PM’s control. Plus, it creates a disincentive for a PM to appoint Admirals, who, unlike the MoD, cannot be removed unilaterally by the PM if the PM disagrees with their strategic direction. That strikes me as an undesirable outcome–the PM should be encouraged to appoint skilled military leaders and delegate substantial authority to them, confident in the knowledge that, where necessary, the PM still retains ultimate strategic direction.

@Pronoun

I think the changes to Charter X(3) and X(4) can go, but other than that, I really can’t see how this amendment reduces the PM’s powers.

We agree here. And if the changes to Charter X. (2) were also cut, then I would have no problem with the remaining amendments.

Edit: As an aside, I am somewhat uncomfortable with the image of the PM becoming an Admiral directly, rather than simply being a member of the Admiralty. It has a sort of authoritarian-government feel to it, i.e., the civilian leader with no real military experience who takes power and proceeds to dress up in military uniform and award themself medals. But that might just be me. In any event, this is a stylistic objection and not substantive. It’s not the basis of my opposition, but just thought I would add.

[Banexet]

Removed the changes to X.3 and X.4 in the Charter after contradictions with Part V of the Charter.

[Pronoun]

@Welly

It eliminates the express provision that “the military will be led by the Prime Minister.”

The current provision is that “[t]he military will be led by the Prime Minister, along with a board of admirals appointed by the Prime Minister and approved by the Assembly” — the rest of the sentence is important! I don’t recall any PM reading that to mean the PM holds an elevated position above the admirals, and in any case Military Code 1(2) wouldn’t align with that reading.

@Welly

To be sure, under this proposal it is possible that the PM could have complete control over the military. If no other Admirals are currently serving, then the PM would be the only member of the Admiralty–the body this proposal charges with “le[ading]” the military–and would be under no obligation to appoint any Admirals.

Sure, that’s a fair point. I think that increases the PM’s powers, though, rather than decreasing them? In any case, I don’t think that’s an issue with amending Charter X(2), I think that’s something to take up with Military Code 1(3), which is what specifies that the military operates only in a very limited capacity with no Admirals and is our current safeguard against that situation.

[Welly]

@Pronoun

The current provision is that “[t]he military will be led by the Prime Minister, along with a board of admirals appointed by the Prime Minister and approved by the Assembly” — the rest of the sentence is important! I don’t recall any PM reading that to mean the PM holds an elevated position above the admirals, and in any case Military Code 1(2) wouldn’t align with that reading.

I find the “along with” clause to be somewhat ambiguous as to who has ultimate authority over the military, especially when read in conjunction with both Charter V.(1), giving the PM responsibility for “directing the regional military” and the provisions of the Military Code that you cite. I understood that ambiguity to be an intentional product of the compromise during the GC that Henn discussed above. But I could be misunderstanding; I was not around for the GC. As I made clear in the last round of proposed military amendments, I would prefer to address that ambiguity by clarifying that the PM has ultimate authority over the military. But since that was rejected by the Assembly, I would prefer at least to retain the ambiguity rather than clarify the opposite way–i.e., that the Admiralty has ultimate authority over the military, not the PM.

@Pronoun

Sure, that’s a fair point. I think that increases the PM’s powers, though, rather than decreasing them? In any case, I don’t think that’s an issue with amending Charter X(2), I think that’s something to take up with Military Code 1(3), which is what specifies that the military operates only in a very limited capacity with no Admirals and is our current safeguard against that situation.

In that specific situation, I agree, this would increase the PM’s powers. But I think that is an undesirable situation for the reasons discussed above. And, unless I am misreading, this proposal would make the Military Code limitations irrelevant, as there would always be at least one Admiral, namely the PM or their designee. Edit: rereading your post now, I see that you said this was something to “take up with Military Code 1(3)” and realize you might have meant that we should consider amending that provision so that it does address the PM-as-single-admiral situation. If that’s what you meant, that’s fair enough, but I would prefer to simply avoid that necessity.

In any event, the more likely scenario seems to be one in which the PM (or designee) is only one vote on a multi-member board, which board this proposal clarifies would have ultimate authority over the military. Again, perhaps you read that as already being the case, but I believe it to be ambiguous as discussed above.

[Banexet]

@Welly

In that specific situation, I agree, this would increase the PM’s powers. But I think that is an undesirable situation for the reasons discussed above. And, unless I am misreading, this proposal would make the Military Code limitations irrelevant, as there would always be at least one Admiral, namely the PM or their designee. Edit: rereading your post now, I see that you said this was something to “take up with Military Code 1(3)” and realize you might have meant that we should consider amending that provision so that it does address the PM-as-single-admiral situation. If that’s what you meant, that’s fair enough, but I would prefer to simply avoid that necessity.

The safeguards in this proposal are only supposed to take effect if there is no PM, MoD, or Admirals. The closest we got to that scenario was right after my resignation as PM after which we had no PM, MoD, and only one admiral (HS). If there are no admirals except for the PM/MoD, then the PM exercises sole control over the military. If there’s someone to lead over the military, I don’t see how we should cease or severely limit operations.

@Welly

In any event, the more likely scenario seems to be one in which the PM (or designee) is only one vote on a multi-member board, which board this proposal clarifies would have ultimate authority over the military. Again, perhaps you read that as already being the case, but I believe it to be ambiguous as discussed above.

This has been the de facto situation in the military for as long as I have been an officer, and this bill clarifies this.

[Welly]

@Banexet

This has been the de facto situation in the military for as long as I have been an officer, and this bill clarifies this.

I am not disagreeing with the fact that this is the de facto situation. I am simply saying that I do not agree with that situation as a policy matter and thus do not believe we should make it the de jure rule as well as the de facto reality.