Question. Do we envision having a specific for proscriptions beyond considering them under the general umbrella of legal questions/challenges to government actions?
I donât think we do.
Any other comments?
Perhaps thereâs room for compromise here â like Assembly oversight for Security Council decisions relating to endorsements (the endorsement cap, who gets a higher cap, etc.). I know thatâs not well-formed legal language, but just throwing ideas out there 
Endorsements in general, whether itâs the cap or the Coral Guard, is something I can support.
Do we really want the Assembly effectively setting the endorsement cap?
I say this as someone who at one point very loudly complained about a CRS-set endo cap, but on principle Iâm opposed to letting the Assembly dictate the endo cap. Itâs too great a security risk.
What about the Coral Guard, or its replacement?
What about it?
Is Assembly oversight of actions taken with regards to the Coral Guard an acceptable idea?
What actions does the Coral Guard have autonomous authority to take/decide?
I was speaking specifically to actions the Security Council takes with regards to the Coral Guard, such as appointments.
The Assemblyâs power to recall a Coral Guard member is sufficient, in my opinion.
That would need a clause specifying that officials on the Coral Guard may be recalled, since theyâre not elected or approved by the Assembly otherwise. What about this:
(X) Members appointed by the Security Council to fulfill a regional security purpose may be recalled by the Assembly as officials of the Coalition.
This would cover the Coral Guard, as well as any other security apparatus that might get created without prior Assembly approval. I can remove the wording clarifying security purpose, to allow the Election Commissioner the ability to be recalled, as well.
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I have changed 1.2 to read as this:
(2) Individuals appointed by the Security Council may be recalled by the Assembly as officials of the Coalition.
That is rather broad language.
My intention is to include those individuals under the Accountability section of the Charter, but as they are not elected nor their appointments approved by the Assembly, are currently excluded from recall provisions.
The coral guard really only has one function, to be a buffer. Iâm not sure how or even why youâd break a rule to be recalled from that. Seems to be overly complicating something that isnât complicated to start with.
Coup.
Not to say that I agree or disagree with Coral Guard recalls, but that is one example of something you could do to warrant a recall.
Wouldnât that just be âtreasonâ, which is already covered by existing rules?
IX.3 of the Charter:
Officers may be recalled by the Assembly in a manner prescribed by law, provided that recalls can only be brought due to dereliction of duty, abuse of power, or violations of the law.
A criminal case may be brought up, but a recall vote can occur simultaneous to that.
I am including them in the potential for recall because I do not see any reason to have any official of the Coalition, especially in the security apparatus, as being totally detached from Assembly oversight or accountability. The incumbent system, without this provision, would leave the Coral Guard or its successor solely beholden to the Security Council, and what the SC may feel is insufficient to remove someone from the CG is not in line with what the Assembly believes is necessary.
At the end of the day, the Coral Guard exists to be a bastion of endorsements to help protect the Coalition. If the majority of the Coalition, expressed through the Assembly, didnât have confidence in one of the key aspects of the regional security apparatus, they ought to have the power to remove them from office.