RAFI(23102024)
Mission “Sharp Demonstration” or the Transcrabrian Theatre
Continuation of whatever it is that we are doing has been termed “Mission Sharp Demonstration”. For those of us wondering why Nasphilitae decided to get involved in NAGB and Okhoa, we have been bestowed with the answer. To demonstrate sharp power over soft and hard power. These reports are as annoying to deal with as they are for me to do.
The Crop Duster pattern:
→ Crop duster planes from the 1960s have reported to been flown across the oceanic waters, from Sea of Kringalia to the Gulf of Good Omen. These have only two modifications in them: double tanks which extends the length of their flights (2000 miles), and an receiver-emitter in the trunk, which emmits…their own positions.
→ Since they are essentially UAVs and carry absolutely no means of knowing where they’re coming from…Two out of 45 have been spotted and shot by U.S.I. and Zuhlgani forces. This is what they are meant to do, as the emitter shuts down upon impact, which the the transmitter can see. However, this doesn’t really matter due to the emitter being visible on all radars. ( @Izaakia ).
→ This operational mission began on 0100 21. October, ceasing at 0900 23. October. It’s goal was to reveal transportation and location intelligence of all actors in the "Vital geostrategic and mercantile routes".
APT I: OSINT detections:
→ AID Unit Nine’s Department Ten is, this time, dispatched with The Militia, forming APT(Advanced Persistent Threat) group I.
→ Operatives of APT I have utilised publicly available information from: Social media, commercial satellite imagery, online directory scraping, and news article publications. The domains of interest were: Zuhlgans, NAGBs, Okhoas, and Krauanagaz. ( @Nicholas , @kingTEM ).
→ Scope of this mission are processed and include: Profiling targets (information on individuals, organisations, and digital footprinnts); Identification of vulnerabilities (security weaknesses in networks, top level domains, systems, applications, API calls, ABI calls and socket-enabled remote code execution); and Monitoring (detection and tracking of malicious activities by observing I/O channels and sandbox replication of their behaviors).
—> Nothing has yet been shared to other actors.
!READ THIS! APT II: Network Protocol and Transfer Protocol Identifications:
→ AID Unit Ten is speculated to be located on vessels of Task Forces Oceanic I, II, III and IV of the Maritime forces. They’ve been given the mission to explore vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure in the same countries. This includes: IT organisations, Think tanks, Education, Government, Finance, Media, Healthcare, TRANSPORTATION, AND International non-governmental organisations (NGOs and NPNGOs). HOWEVER, none of these can be observd with any merit prior to exploring Commmunications which are used. This is done in five ways. Three are important to report on for now.
→ Attack Surface Mitigation identification: ASMs are observed through records of CVE patches. Usually, these are either public or easily retrieved from digital footprints left in persistent memory. The reason is to see which areas were previously attacked and how they were mitigated.
→ Network and Transfer Protocol identification: Includes both commercial-civilian and governmental. It looks at the infrastructural protocols used for network availability, as well as file/data/email transfer protocols wich are available in each country.
—> Internet-facing commercial router port penetration testing: This is simple (civilian-available) router scanning of ports used for communication. Countries may some times deviate from the norm, which leaves certain civilian, business and governmental hardware networks with public-facing ports. Intelligence agencies use them to : packet sniff traffic, create network topology hashtrips(APT I is required for this to have any beneficial result), and have zero-day backdoors into civilian-grade hardware. I know, as I’ve made one.
—> Okhoa Protectorate and Krauanagaz were contacted for having public-facing ports, which were used to monitor traffic coming from Zuhlgan. AID Unit Ten has since closed closed these ports, though information regardig packet sniffers left on them as well as potential network worms were the given to the two governments. ( @Kobegr01 )
→ SIGNED REPORTER: Lumen
