Defense Act

I’ve included that in my draft.

I would rather this go into the Defence Act. There is little reason why matters of policy should be in the Charter rather than in law.

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I have a suggested addition to the language of the bill:

The military will endeavor to:

  1. Foster regional activity,
  2. Defend the Coalition and its allies,
  3. Represent the power, influence, and policies of the Coalition abroad,
  4. Protect innocent regions from attack,
  5. Promote legitimate, native democratic institutions across the world

A simplified Defence Act, inspired by Belschaft’s draft but strengthening defender provisions and removing mentions to the General Corps.


Defence Act
An act to establish a regional military and regulate its scope of mission

1. General Provisions

(1) This law is a constitutional law and has precedence over all general laws and regulations.

(2) This law considers the following terms:

  1. Portfolio Minister - the minister appointed by the Prime Minister to oversee the portfolio related to the military.
  2. Offensive Operation - any operation whose effect is the attack, destruction, vandalisation, subjugation, or colonisation of a region.
  3. Hostile Act - actions that have a material detrimental effect over the Coalition or its interests, or rhetoric that can be reasonably read as inciting the commission of hostile acts by others.

2. Establishment of a Regional Military

(1) The Special Forces are the sole regional military.

(2) The Prime Minister is the commander-in-chief of the Special Forces and exercises civilian command and control over it.

(3) The Prime Minister may issue lawful orders to the Special Forces, and no member of the same may refuse such lawful order subject to penalties that may be established by law or regulation.

(4) The Prime Minister may issue regulations as they deem necessary to ensure the proper recruitment, maintenance, and overall functioning of the Special Forces in accordance with its scope of mission and regional interests.

(5) The Prime Minister appoints a body of no less than three senior commanders for a term of twelve months, with the approval of the Assembly, to provide military advice and exercise operational command over the Special Forces.

(56) The Portfolio Minister, if one is appointed, may act in the name of the Prime Minister for the purposes of this law, but the Prime Minister retains the authority to overrule any such actions.

3. Scope of Mission

(1) The Special Forces protect the Coalition and its allies, as lawfully directed by civilian and military leadership.

(2) The Special Forces conduct their operations consistent with the objectives of protecting innocent regions from attack, and promoting legitimate, native, democratic institutions abroad.

(3) The Special Forces may not engage in offensive operations except in cases where the Prime Minister directed such action towards any the following:

  1. Regions that espouse hateful ideologies.
  2. Regions against with the Coalition is in a state of war, as declared by the Assembly.
  3. Regions that have committed hostile acts against the Coalition.

What is the logic for doing away with the General Corps?

I think the idea of appointing Generals makes sense: we want officers with experience who have a leadership role and help keep the military's institutional memory. That said, I think it would be more logical to give the Prime Minister (and the Defence Minister) more flexibility in terms of how exactly to structure the hierarchy and make the appointments that they deem necessary. In that sense I wouldn't see this as an abolition of the General Corps as much as just giving the civilian leadership more flexibility in terms of setting up its structure, duties, and membership.

I can see the logic behind that thinking, but like a lot of other proposed changes we’re making everything dependant on the whims of the Prime Minister and their decision making instead of creating lasting institutions which don’t get completely upended every time someone new is elected to office.

Speaking as a multiple-term former MoD, I can at least get behind the idea of simplifying the command structure and giving the PM a little more flexibility, but I would like to see at least some more solid form of institutional memory in command positions rather than just leaving it up to the PM and their appointed minister every term. You mention that as an advantage of this, but I’m not entirely sure I’m sold on that idea because I fear we may be giving too much flexibility to the commander in chief and trading off institutional memory. That was one of the most important points I argued for three and a half years ago when we initially passed the resolution to go defender - we need those institutions to ensure the continued strength of our defender convictions.

I guess it will maybe be up to the first PM/DM under the new system to establish that. I’m not necessarily opposed to the idea of making the PM commander in chief, because the old MoD position always ended up being a military person anyway and leaned heavily toward the “ex officio fourth general” part of the role rather than an actual civilian leader. I tried some different things to that end but it always just felt like a military appointment to begin with.

I agree with you in part and with Belschaft in part I guess is what I’m saying.

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Some grammaring: since Special Forces is plural, the words that come after should be “protect” and “conduct”.

(1) The Special Forces protect the Coalition and its allies, as lawfully directed by civilian and military leadership.

(2) The Special Forces conduct its operations consistent with the objectives of protecting innocent regions from attack, and promoting legitimate, native, democratic institutions abroad.

We could keep a general staff, under both the defense and PM. Using a real world example, joint chiefs of staff advise the cabinet and president of the US on military operations. It would continue institutional knowledge, and be able to advise a PM that may have not personally been involved with our military operations to make wise decisions.

Out of curiosity, and I mean this as a genuine question for my own understanding, is there a reason why the SPSF specifically requires that level of institutional safeguarding (in the sense of a General Corps codified in law) vis-à-vis other ministries that get by with their own, minister-defined, hierarchies? What are the issues that we need to consider in that respect? Again, I’m asking out of genuine curiosity, because I obviously don’t have enough context to know for myself.

This is kinda the idea I was going for. A general staff would serve a similar function to the joint chiefs of staff in the American government.

I like the idea of a PM-appointed defense minister, that much is fine, but having some form of a general staff that is generally independent of the whims of politics is important for the same reason the resolution on adopting defending military principles was important. We need to have something institutionally in place to safeguard against insurgents completely dismantling and remaking the military to their own agenda without the consent of the military’s current leadership. That’s more important in the military than other branches because of the nature of our work. We are defenders, and that means we more than others need institutional memory to serve as a check against potential intruders and insurgents.

Would we want to codify a set term for appointments to this body?

If we base it in the joint chiefs, they are subject to senate approval and can be dismissed by the president.

Had to do a bit of digging, seems the chairman serves a four year term, I’ll link the relevant sources.

https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title10/subtitleA/part1/chapter5&edition=prelim

I have made certain changes, including mandating the appointment of a senior command. As always, I’m open to comments.

That looks like a fairly good compromise between institutional memory and PM’s discretion. I could get behind this.

As I am no longer a member of the SPSF, I have no issues with how it’s run, but the SPSF will always be a soft spot. Still not a fan of an appointed MoD/leader/deputy as it opens up a leader being appointed that has NO idea what gameplay is and devalues the General staff. Would not have an issue if the appointed head needs to be approved of a majority of the General Staff. I also do think that being defender needs to be codified. That is more a cabinet directive/ consensus then a law. Creates a reason for a discussion that really doesn’t need to happen if the SPSF decides to go independent again, even if for un and games with an ally.

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I would argue that the exact same risk exists with elected ministers. You could very well make the argument that legislators could elect a minister who has no notion of military gameplay, simply on account of them being popular. If anything a Prime Minister could be more likely to make a sound appointment because, as the sole elected figure in the executive, it is in their best interest to ensure that they appoint someone who help them succeed.

Let’s imagine however, for the sake of argument, that the above is not the case. It is made clear in the proposed Charter that ministers must be confirmed by the Assembly. Is there still a risk that someone underqualified will be appointed and confirmed? Yes, there is always a risk that the system will fail, and for that we have an Assembly that should be ready to hold its executive to account, both in terms of asking questions and, if necessary, initiating recalls.

I disagree. While the military is an important aspect of the region that requires a certain level of technical and institutional know how, at the end of the day it still is an institution that serves the interests of the region as determined by civilian leaders who are democratically elected to pursue a given mandate.

If we are to give senior command a veto over ministerial appointments then I would expect the same privilege to be given to the senior staff of other ministries; that is, if the concern is the overall principle of guarding ministerial quality rather than just carving out exceptions for the military. As much as I respect the role that it performs for our region, and I do, the military is not entitled to this level of special arrangements at the expect of other ministries, each of whom also performs key functions for the region.

I’m unsure if you mean that the current defender alignment should be codified, or if that’s a typo and you mean that it should not. If the former, that is already considered in Section 3, Articles 2-3 of the Defender Act, which outline the scope of operations that the military may undertake.

If you mean the latter, and that the alignment should be codified as regulation rather than law, interestingly enough I would agree. I consider myself a defender to the extent that I think it’s wrong to attack regions and it’s right to assist in the defence and liberation of innocent regions, but I don’t think this principle is such a cornerstone of South Pacifican values that it should be protected at all costs. I think the approach should be that defending is consistent with our values, as opposed to defending being a value in and of itself.

That being said, I think the current draft is fine in that it codified what the military can and cannot do, while allowing a future Assembly to have that discussion if a large enough majority feels that the region is best served with a different alignment.

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Typo. I do NOT think it should be codified in the charter. I know it’s in the defender act, but that can be changed as needed with less stress than a charter change.

Two comments:

  1. I think “no less than three” could present issues at times where we don’t have three senior commanders in the military. I think it would be okay to say “at least one” or “at least one and no more than five” as this is more flexible to potentially available staff.
  2. Does one Prime Minister get to appoint all the Commanders to twelve month terms? Is it “once a Commander is appointed, they serve for twelve months and then would have to be reconfirmed by the PM one year later”? I feel like the language is somewhat ambiguous and that could just create problems down the road.

“are have” feels like a typo.