Cutting down the executive

I think this proposal can address both of these? It frees ministers to explore new projects when they feel them to be necessary, but also frees ministers to cut more projects that are no longer necessary.

1 Like

I have no broad issues with the proposal, I think it’s a worthwhile restructuring. My big concern is just abolishing the Ministry of Engagement and folding its projects (but not legal responsibilities) back into a wider Regional Affairs revival.

I definitely think there is merit to breaking the MoE up. The integration and outreach portion of the ministry could be put back into the MoC, while the infrastructure could be part of a separate independent body (perhaps a committee???).

I can recall the days when I would ask individual members of the region to make graphics for me, or would ask people for my endo lists (which now is publicly accessible).

1 Like

We could roll this into another office much like OWL currently is.

A somewhat relevant thing regarding MoE. Back when the split happened, I recall we very much considered MoE’s job description in the Charter as somewhat of a temporary placeholder and the ministry itself as doing whatever culture and media didn’t do. Something more concrete regarding the job description would have been done later. That of course didn’t happen and MoE basically turned into the ministry of personal pet projects and anything that isn’t newspapers or events.

Does anyone have any thoughts or concerns with this wording/language?

I haven’t seen much opposition to these ideas as a concept (although please do speak up if I’ve gotten the wrong impression :stuck_out_tongue:), but before this goes to vote I do want to see how people are feeling about the language itself. I’m not sure how much of it will make it to final omnibus — in particular if we change up our ministries, go for an appointed cabinet, etc. — but it’s probably best to not count on that at this stage.

Your proposed bill goes beyond its scope. It removes the authority of the MoFA to make treaties from the Charter and also removes the intelligence office.

I felt it was implicitly covered under the Treaties Act already, which I feel is a better place to put a provision like that anyway. Making treaties is a common way to maintain our foreign policy, but it’s not the only way — it’s not as if a MoFA term with no treaties passed should always be considered unsuccessful.

If it’s really a concern, would this amendment to the Treaties Act address it?

(1) Upon introduction the receipt of a treaty by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Assembly, the Assembly will debate the proposed treaty for at least five days before any vote is held.


Can’t remove an intelligence office that doesn’t exist :stuck_out_tongue:

More generally speaking, I’m not sure what that clause really does. It gives the Minister of Defense the option to create an intelligence office, yes. Are we sure they wouldn’t have that power without that clause? And the Charter already establishes an Intelligence Coordinator who works with the Minister of Defense.

1 Like

This is something that should be in the Charter. More importantly, the Treaties Act does not have the explicit grant of authority to the MoFA that the treaties act does.

To be honest, I’m still not sure why this is so important to you. I mean, it would be helpful if you explained why you feel this should be in the charter or why an explicit grant of authority specifically to initiate treaty negotiations is so necessary.

I’ll move all that to an Assembly topic though. I don’t really think it’s a groundbreaking change and we have bigger fish to fry here.

With that said, here’s the updated language preserving current clauses on powers specifically assigned to the MoFA:

View Text

It’s not so much about treaty negotiations as it is making it so that someone has the explicit power to present treaties to the Assembly. They are part of our laws, after all.

I’m not sure I follow this logic. Do you mean that, absent that provision, the Assembly wouldn’t be able to recognise any treaties brought forth by the MoFA?

The original purpose of the “sole power” clause was to prevent the Assembly from trying to sign a treaty itself, which was an insane thing some people threatened to do back when our alignment was up in the air. It’s essentially saying, “foreign policy is dictated by the Cabinet, not the legislature.”

I motion the draft to vote if possible.

You need at least five days of debate, so not yet.

Apologies for being late this is discussion, but I’d like to offer something of a counter perspective here.

While I don’t disagree that this is bloated, I feel like the culture of the region lately is that if it isn’t explicitly written into law it’s not part of the job description/responsibility, rather than giving people leeway to do the things as they see fit. And, part of the problem has been the court’s pedantic reading of laws to enforce only the strictest interpretation of what is spelled out, but is also just the general culture of the region lately which is only interested in doing things that are explicitly allowed.

While I would be in favor of cutting down the proscribed responsibilities of the executive branch is that doing to put us in a situation where the executive feels it doesn’t have the power/responsibility to do anything? After all that’s what people have been arguing in relation to the PM that since the powers are especially proscribed, the PM doesn’t have any.

I was agreeing with you until you said this. I don't mean to single you out, because this isn't a "you" problem, but it does give me an opportunity to address this.

I am getting really sick of people blaming the High Court for the ailments of the region. Do I seriously need to quote the summaries of all the rulings from the past few years? I might as well, just so people can see for themselves how mundane and non-ridiculous they are, and in some cases even deferential to what the Assembly may wish to legislate.

(2103.HQ) Enforceability of Article 2.2 of the Legislator Committee Act It is the opinion of the Court that the Legislator Committee is bound by the timing requirement laid out in Article 2, Section 2 of the Legislator Committee Act. However, there is no sanction, under current law, that the Legislator Committee may face, and, as such, the timing requirement is essentially nulled. The Assembly of the South Pacific is recommended to do as they see fit to either make the requirement binding by associating a penalty or crime to noncompliance, repealing the timing requirement, ensuring a constant (sufficient) staffing, or acting on any other solution that this Court did not mention.

(2104.HQ) Voting Rights of Service Members It is the opinion of the Court that Article 3, Section 3, Sub-Section B of the Elections Act requires that a member of the South Pacific Special Forces send a telegram to the election commissioner as well as post their vote to the Regional Message Board while also tagging the election commissioner in the post. The Election Commissioner should only count and record votes that were received from both submission points.

(2105.HQ) Requirements of OWL Recommendations and Cabinet Override Powers It is the opinion of the Court that while the Office of World Assembly Legislation does not have an explicit and binding duty to conduct its voting and recommendation process for each and every proposal, it does have a requirement to be diligent in its duties and avoid systematic failures to conduct the voting and recommendation process for any proposal that it encounters. It is also the opinion of the Court that the power of the Cabinet to override votes extends only to the votes cast by the Delegate, and therefore that the Cabinet has no power to override or otherwise impede OWL's voting and recommendation process from reaching its conclusion.

(2106.HQ) Legality of Embassy Closure Operations Against Regions that Espouse Hateful Ideologies It is the opinion of the Court that a region that has embassies with fascist regions but does not itself hold such beliefs cannot be the subject of offensive action. This is consistent with Article X, Section 3 of the Charter, which says that offensive action can only be taken against regions with which the South Pacific is at war and regions that espouse hateful ideologies, as well as the Resolution on Adopting Defending Military Principles and the policies adopted by the Cabinet in recent months. The act of having an embassy with fascist regions, without any further action or more explicit endorsement of fascist principles, is not sufficient to qualify for offensive action.

(2107.HQ) Legality of Concrete Slab Running for Local Councillor It is the opinion of the Court that term limits only apply when the candidate in question had served two full terms in succession. Since Concrete Slab had only served one full and one partial term, they are therefore permitted to run for Local Council in the upcoming November 2021 Local Council election. This conclusion was reached by considering the various possible interpretations arising from the ambiguities in that law, and deriving the most viable interpretation by a process of elimination.

(2108.HQ) Legality of the Minister of Culture Making Polls It is the opinion of the Court that it is it is generally lawful for those Officials allotted Regional Officer powers to exercise them, within the confines of any relevant restrictions properly established.

(2201.HQ) Procedure for Single-Candidate Delegate Elections It is the opinion of the Court that a single candidate running in a Delegate election does not complicate, violate, or otherwise impact the existing procedures found in the Elections Act. The Court makes this determination through its interpretation of the Elections Act and what the Re-Open Nominations option means within existing law. The Elections Act requires Re-Open Nominations to be listed as a "candidate", therefore, so long as at least one candidate declares for the position, the on-site voting process can occur following the forum-based vote with the single declared candidate and the Re-Open Nominations option being listed on the ballot. This assessment was clarified and codified by the Cabinet and the Assembly following the issuance and adoption of the executive order, which created Sub-section G of Article 3, Section 2 of the Elections Act.

(2203.HQ) Effects of Resignations It is the opinion of the Court that under current law, resignations must have immediate effectiveness or a set time of effectiveness in the future. A resignation that has indefinite effectiveness is not valid since the position will not be vacant for a special election to be triggered. A special election can only be lawfully triggered and begun when an office is vacant, which is what triggers an election under Article 6, Section 1 of the Elections Act.

(2207.HQ) In re Assembly Vote Closures It is the opinion of the Court that votes in the Assembly should open the moment that the voting thread is posted and that they should close the moment that the poll automatically closes or when the time stated in the written deadline is reached, whichever is second, but nothing in this ruling should be interpreted as giving license to the Chair to engage in a pattern of discrepancies or to cause a discrepancy so significant that a reasonable person would deem it an attempt to circumvent the Legislative Procedure Act.

(2209.HR) In-game consent for A2205.05 Amendment to Article XIV It is the opinion of the Court that the Chair's determination on the matter of A2205.05 Amendment to Article XIV - Great Councils is lawful and should be upheld. Consequently, the amendment has the full force of law and all actions taken pursuant to it, in particular A2205.06 Great Council Convening Resolution of 2022, are also deemed lawful. The Chair of the Great Council is instructed to take all appropriate actions as required of them by said resolution.

I motion to vote on this draft.

The motion is recognised and will be brought to a vote on 2022-10-19T15:00:00Z.

Please go here to vote on this proposal.