[2541.AB] Repeal and Replace of the Judicial Act

Assembly
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Members of the Assembly,

As I’ve mentioned to many of you, I have been working on a reform of the Judicial Act for some time. With no disrespect intended towards its authors, it’s a somewhat clunky statute that includes several anomalous features (e.g., apparently authorizing appeal of a decision by two Justices to a single Justice, defining a sentencing as a type of case rather than part of a criminal case, etc.). Ultimately, I decided that it would be more efficient to simply repeal and replace the Judicial Act rather than make amendments to it. Below is draft legislation that would accomplish that, first a resolution repealing the current Judicial Act, then a draft replacement bill, which was partially based on Kringle’s KWB Omnibus.

The draft is a bit lengthy, so here is a quick summary of the key changes:

  • Creation of a functional system of appeal. Under the current Judicial Act, the appellate system is irrationally structured, and appeals are essentially never attempted. Two Justices sign an initial opinion (which is itself a bit odd; typically the initial trial/ hearing phase of a case is heard by a single judge), then, apparently, an appeal could be taken from those two Justices to two different Justices. That makes no sense. The theory behind appeals is that by bringing more judicial minds to bear on a question, there is a greater likelihood of resolving that question correctly. Whether or not you accept that proposition, there is no reason to believe that two Justices not initially assigned to a case are any more likely to resolve it accurately than the two Justices who were. And, given the frequency of recusals in our small community, it is very possible that only one other Justice would be available to hear an appeal, meaning the appeal would be from two Justices to one! The proposed legislation restructures the case process such that every case is initially assigned to one Justice, who hears and decides the case from start to finish. Then an appeal may be filed with the entire High Court, which can either decide to hear the appeal or let the initial Justice’s decision stand.
  • Addition of Review Requests as a type of case that the High Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide. The Court is clearly empowered by the Charter to hear review requests, and it has traditionally categorized and resolved cases under that appellation. But, confusingly, the current Judicial Act makes no mention of Review Requests or who can file them. This bill resolves that odd omission.
  • Removal of Sentencing as a type of case. Sentencing is a phase of a criminal case, not a different case entirely. But the current Judicial Act treats it as the latter, which this bill corrects.
  • Codification of the Court’s power–which it has long exercised by default–to enact further rules and policies for case management and processing.
  • General streamlining and clarification of language and structure throughout the entire statute.

I look forward to the Assembly’s thoughts.

Repeal of the Judicial Act
Draft Replacement Bill

Judiciary Act

An act to regulate the composition and procedures of the High Court.

1. Judicial Appointments and Conduct

(1) The High Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and at least two Associate Justices.

(2) Justices of the High Court must be citizens of the Coalition.

(3) The Prime Minister shall, in consultation with the Court, appoint Justices of the High Court.

(4) Nominees to the High Court must be confirmed by the Assembly prior to assuming office.

(5) Justices must take an oath of confidentiality and impartiality upon their confirmation by the Assembly and prior to assuming office.

(6) Justices must conform to the following standards of conduct in the discharge of their official duties:

  1. Rule upon what is written in law and what can be reasonably interpreted from the surrounding context without being influenced by prejudice, personal bias, undue influence, corruption, or other matters unbecoming of a judge.
  2. Consider the impact of rulings so that, when possible, no individual is empowered to unjustly exploit said rulings and no ruling is absurd to the expense of more logical or less disruptive outcomes.
  3. Refrain from opining on the wisdom or desirability of political actions or making comments that could be reasonably read to constitute an intrusion of the Court on political affairs.
  4. Maintain cordial relations with their fellow Justices and with the broader regional community.
  5. Be reasonably inquisitorial and exercise professional skepticism.

2. The Chief Justice

(1) The Chief Justice shall be elected by the Court from among the Associate Justices.

(2) The Chief Justice shall hold office at the pleasure of the Court and pursuant to Article XI of the Charter.

(3) The Chief Justice shall be responsible for all matters related to the administration of the Court, including but not limited to the following:

  1. Processing case submissions.
  2. Maintaining decorum and civility in all venues where the Court conducts its business.
  3. Maintaining an archive of High Court cases and opinions.
  4. Managing the rotation of case assignments to Justices.
  5. Leading discussion regarding whether requests for review should be granted.
  6. Ordering the recusal of Justices in cases where their impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
  7. Representing the institutional interests of the Court.

(4) The Chief Justice shall hold seniority over their fellow Justices but shall not exercise any authority related to the administration of the Court beyond that which is granted by law without the consent of a majority of the Court.

(5) In the event that the Chief Justice is unable or unwilling to perform their duties with respect to a particular case, the most senior available Associate Justice, as determined by order of confirmation date, shall perform those duties.

(6) The Associate Justices may collectively order the recusal of the Chief Justice in cases where the Chief Justice’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

3. Jurisdiction and Powers

(1) The High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and authority to decide the following types of cases:

  1. Legal Question - a question on the meaning of a law or the applicability of a law to a concrete or hypothetical situation.
  2. Review Request - a request that the Court declare void and enjoin the execution or enforcement of any general law, regulation, directive, determination or any other official act of government, in whole or in part, upon a determination that it violates the terms of the Charter or any other constitutional law.
  3. Criminal Complaint - a request that a member of the South Pacific be indicted for committing one or more of the crimes codified in the Criminal Code.

(2) In addition to all other powers set forth in the Charter and this Act, a Presiding Justice may issue temporary injunctions to compel an individual or institution to do or refrain from doing something, when necessary for the orderly progression of a case, to prevent irreparable harm, or to maintain public order, provided, however, that no temporary injunction may:

  1. Have a duration longer than four weeks, unless extended subject to the same limitation; or
  2. Unreasonably restrict the right guaranteed to members under Article 3 of the Charter or deprive individuals from the right to judicial recourse.

(3) In addition to all other powers set forth in the Charter and this Act, the High Court may, by majority vote, issue such orders as are necessary and appropriate in aid of its jurisdiction, provided, however, that any injunction issued pursuant to this authority must comport with the requirements for and limitations upon the issuance of temporary injunctions by Presiding Justices.

(4) The High Court may, by majority vote, adopt policies and procedures for case management, provided that such policies and procedures are not inconsistent with any other provision of law.

4. Procedures for the Submission and Consideration of Civil Cases

(1) Any member of the South Pacific may submit a legal question.

(2) Any member of the South Pacific or any party adversely affected by an official act of the South Pacific government may submit a review request.

(3) The Court shall hear and decide all civil cases that are submitted for its consideration, except the Court shall not hear any civil case that:

  1. refers to a matter of political determination rather than a matter of law;
  2. was not submitted by a proper party;
  3. is not justiciable; or
  4. is frivolous in nature.

(4) The Chief Justice shall assign a Justice to preside over each civil case that has been submitted.

(5) The Presiding Justice shall be responsible for all matters related to the management and resolution of the case including, but not limited to the following:

  1. Determining if the case is justiciable and, if not, ordering the dismissal of the case.
  2. Ordering the production of information that the Presiding Justice deems relevant to the case; such information must be produced by the recipient of such orders under penalty of contempt.
  3. Considering all the information that is available or that has been obtained over the course of the case and that may be relevant to it.
  4. Issuing a decision and, if necessary, a remedy that adequately answers the question or request that was made to the Court.

(6) The Presiding Justice must promptly notify a government official against whose official conduct a review request has been submitted and afford them no fewer than seven days to present a legal justification for their actions, but failure to provide such justification within the allotted time may not be used as grounds for appeal.

(7) When a civil case is dismissed on the grounds that the case is non-justiciable, the Presiding Justice shall issue an opinion explaining the reasons for that dismissal if such an opinion is timely requested by a member of the South Pacific.

(8) The standard of proof in all civil cases shall be a preponderance of the evidence.

5. Procedures for the Submission and Consideration of Criminal Cases

(1) Any member of the South Pacific may submit a criminal complaint.

(2) The Court shall hear and decide all criminal cases that are submitted for its consideration, except the Court shall not hear any criminal case in which the complaint:

  1. was not submitted by a proper party;
  2. does not contain sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause; or
  3. is frivolous in nature.

(3) The Chief Justice shall assign a Justice to preside over each criminal case that has been submitted.

(4) The Presiding Justice shall be responsible for all matters related to the management and resolution of the case including, but not limited to the following:

  1. Determining if there is probable cause that the accused individual committed a criminal act and, if not, ordering the dismissal of the criminal complaint.
  2. Ordering the production of information that the Presiding Justice deems relevant to the case; such information must be produced by the recipient of such orders under penalty of contempt.
  3. Calling for and appointing counsel to represent the defendant, if the Defendant requests court-appointed counsel.
  4. Considering all the information that is available or that has been obtained over the course of the case and that may be relevant to it.
  5. Issuing a decision and verdict and, if necessary, a sentence that adequately addresses the alleged criminal violation.

(5) The Presiding Justice must promptly notify a party against whom a criminal complaint has been submitted and afford them no fewer than seven days to present a reasonable defense, but failure to provide a defense within the allotted time may not be used as grounds for appeal.

(6) When a criminal case is dismissed for lack of probable cause, the Presiding Justice shall issue an opinion explaining the reasons for that dismissal if such an opinion is timely requested by a member of the South Pacific.

(7) The Presiding Justice may find an individual guilty only upon finding it substantially more likely than not that the indicted party committed the relevant crime.

(8) Following a guilty verdict, the Presiding Justice shall issue a sentence proportional to the crime and the circumstances under which it was committed; interested parties must be given a reasonable time to communicate any mitigating or aggravating factors that may be relevant to the determination of the sentence.

6. Appellate Procedure

(1) The following parties may file a petition requesting that the full High Court review a decision or order issued by a Presiding Justice:

  1. Any party adversely affected by a Presiding Justice’s final decision in a civil case.
  2. A convicted party in a criminal case.
  3. Any individual who is the subject of a temporary injunction.
  4. Any individual held in contempt by a Presiding Justice for failure to produce information requested by the Presiding Justice.

(2) A petition for review may be filed only on grounds of failure to follow proper procedure, error or contradictions of law, judicial misconduct, or the emergence of relevant new information not reasonably available to the petitioning party at the time of the Presiding Justice’s decision.

(3) In determining whether to grant a petition for review, the High Court shall consider the significance of the legal issues at stake, the need for definitive resolution of ambiguity or uncertainty in any regional law at issue, the existence of conflict between decisions issued by different Presiding Justices on the same or similar issues, and any other compelling reasons that favor granting the petition.

(4) No petition for review shall be granted unless a majority of the Court votes in favor of granting said petition.

(5) If a petition for review is denied, then the Presiding Justice’s decision shall remain in force.

(6) When a petition for review is denied, the Court shall issue an opinion explaining the reasons for that denial if such an opinion is timely requested by a member of the South Pacific.

(7) If a petition for review is granted, then the full High Court shall consider and rule upon the underlying case.

(8) Upon granting a petition for review, the High Court may, by majority vote, affirm, reverse, or reverse and remand a Presiding Justice’s decision on any lawful grounds, except that the High Court shall not reverse any of the Presiding Justice’s factual findings unless such findings were clearly erroneous.

(9) If the High Court is evenly divided over whether to affirm or reverse a Presiding Justice’s decision, then said decision shall be affirmed.

7. Confidentiality

(1) By default, material submitted for a case shall be submitted alongside the case proceedings in a public venue.

(2) Material that is confidential and may harm regional security may be submitted to the Court, provided that the Court works with the relevant authority to redact information that may harm regional security.

(3) Material that is of a personal nature, such as that which reveals personally identifiable information, or which would otherwise unreasonably violate personal privacy, shall be provided to the Court on a confidential basis only; such material may be published in a redacted form only if a reasonable person could not deduce the identity being protected.

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I’ll have substantive comments later, but just from a quick skim — it was kind of jarring to see the Associate Justice/Chief Justice introduced partway through the bill without being earlier defined.

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That’s fair and an easy fix. Will do when I turn the next round of edits.

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If, hypothetically, there are no Justices on the court, how would the appointment be made?

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I would like to congratulate the Chair for introducing this excellent bill. I am happy to support it as written. However, I do have a few suggestions that I would prefer to see included.

First, regarding appellate procedure, I welcome the move toward en banc hearings. As for voting, I agree that the most reasonable outcome of a tie vote should be the affirmation of the Presiding Justice’s decision. However, I believe an exception should be made in criminal cases, particularly since we effectively operate within an inquisitorial system without a trial by jury. In line with the maxim in dubio pro reo, I propose that in the event of a tie vote in a criminal case, the interpretation most favorable to the defendant should prevail.

Second, with regard to appellate procedure, I would also like to see codified the right for a justice who disagrees with the rationale, but concurs with the outcome, to file a concurring opinion, as well as for a dissenting justice to file a dissenting opinion.

Third, while most cases can likely be resolved through the statutory remedies provided in this bill, I believe we should also allow for the possibility of the Court issuing such writs as may be necessary when no statutory remedies suffice. Our legal system is fundamentally common law based, albeit with certain peculiarities, and it would not be repugnant to our legal system to grant the Court this discretion. This could be achieved either by the Assembly codifying a specific list of writs available to the Court or by adopting a more open ended statutory construction. I would favor the latter. For inspiration, we can look to the All Writs Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which states that

The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law

and adopt a similar provision.

Fourth, whether intentionally or not, the Court has set a dangerous and, in my opinion, erroneous precedent in Concerning the Procedural Requirements of § 2(2) of the Regional Officers Act, [2506.HQ] (2025), asserting that a legal provision can cease to be ambiguous simply because two or more government officials agree on its meaning. While I acknowledge that it is sometimes reasonable for the Court to defer to the executive branch’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute, it should not play a role in determining justiciability. Therefore, I believe it would be prudent for the Assembly, in light of the ongoing revision of the Judicial Act, to include a provision with a legislative finding to this effect.

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I’m not sure this is the case? I consult the Assembly > MATT Duck Law Archive far more often than I consult past judicial opinions regarding questions about the law. I don’t think that much of our law comes from judicial precedent instead of legislative statute; in fact, in my experience, it’s rather the opposite.

In any case, personally I am entirely fine with with one of those ‘peculiarities’ being that we have a defined process and scope for judicial injunctions. Is there any specific power beyond “compel[ling] an individual or institution to do or refrain from doing something” that you feel the Court should have?

Interesting. I don’t think it’s necessarily true that decisions of justiciability even hold precedential weight, but I think I could imagine a colorable argument otherwise.

That’s also not how I read the decision :face_with_tongue: so if we want to codify this, I think it’s a bit of a weird thing to single out (there’s lots of general guidelines we could lay out for justiciability if we wanted) but I don’t actually mind.

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As to section 3.1(b), maybe this is a little overly semantic, but the way you’ve written it, it doesn’t seem like the court has the power to order the government to take an action that it’s required to take. Is this intentional?

I notice that you seem to have left consideration of different cases entirely up to the Chief Justice’s discretion. Aren’t there cases – especially in the case of judicial review and criminal cases – that should be required to be heard (as long as they’re justiciable)?

In section 4.8, you say “burden of proof,” but I think you mean “standard of proof.” I also notice that you haven’t defined a standard of proof in criminal cases.

Maybe this is also how it is right now, but shouldn’t there be some provision for court-appointed counsel in criminal cases?

It seems like it’s possible for the presiding justice in the first instance to sit on the appellate panel. In that case, I’d have to think that appeals wouldn’t be different from what we have now in practice, because you’d need the other two justices to agree in order to overturn a ruling.

In section 2.6, I would suggest adding grounds of fact as a permissible basis for appeal.

I think the standard to release personal–I assume this refers to RL–information in 7.3 is too permissive. First, it’s not entirely clear to me whether the “identity being protected” refers to both real-life identity and online identity, or real-life identity only. Second, as a broader point, I think it would be highly improper to disclose RL personal information about someone in public, without their consent, even if they could not necessarily be identified.

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The bill defines the standard of proof in § 5(6): “The Presiding Justice may find an individual guilty only upon finding it substantially more likely than not that the indicted party committed the relevant crime”.

@Pronoun I shall get back to you tomorrow. For now, however, permit me to note that I am positively shaken to my very core by your insinuation that we might be operating under some sort of quasi-civil law system. :grin:

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This is a great draft overall and is a lot better than the current judicial act we have today. However, I feel there is a huge lacking of separation of powers and I still feel that as a democracy that should be included. Democracies are a lot stronger with separation of powers. That is the only concern I have otherwise I support.

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Separation of powers exists in the Charter.

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Thank you all for the helpful thoughts and comments. Some responses are below. I’ll probably turn a full round of edits this weekend in accordance with the below.

I don’t think that hypothetical is very likely to come to pass. The requirement that the PM consult with the Court on appointments is in the current Judicial Act, and has never prevented an appointment as far as I am aware. In any event, the law cannot command the impossible. If there were no member of the Court with which the PM could consult, then the PM could simply submit appointments to the Assembly directly.

As a firm believer in the rule of lenity, I agree with this edit and will implement it.

I agree that Justices should be permitted to file concurrences and dissents, but I’m not sure that has to be codified into the Judiciary Act. Is there any lawful basis on which the Court could restrict the ability of Justices to issue such opinions? If not (and I don’t believe that there is), then I would generally prefer that practice to develop as a custom of the Court, rather than via legislation.

Regrettably, I agree with Erstavik that the Court’s opinion is susceptible to that interpretation, even if it is not the only plausible reading. But I also agree with Pronoun that it’s somewhat awkward to single out a single judicial opinion for repeal. My general view on this precedent is that the Assembly should monitor its development carefully. Since its meaning is at least ambiguous, we should see how, if at all, the Court applies it going forward before stepping in to legislate more detailed justiciability rules.

I’m not sure I follow this comment. The Chief Justice merely assigns each case to an individual Justice to preside over the matter. The Chief Justice has no authority to decline to consider a case on behalf of the Court. Could you point me to the language that you believe creates such authority?

Fair point. I will make that edit.

I’m not sure how that would work given that the Court really can’t force any member to represent someone in the way that RL public defenders are employed to do that. I suppose the Court could make a public call for volunteers, but would that be any different than the criminal defendant doing the same?

That’s correct, but it would still be different than it is now. Today, we have a situation where two Justices (the appeal “panel”) are asked to overturn a decision by two other Justices (the initial “panel” who issued the decision that is being appealed). That does not make sense. In the scenario you lay out, it requires two Justices (i.e., 2/3 of a hypothetical 3 member Court sitting en banc) to overturn the decision of one Justice (i.e., the Presiding Justice who issued the decision that is being appealed). That is much more in line with how appeals are designed to work–more judges overturning the decision of fewer.

I’ve intentionally kept factual review quite limited, i.e., to new evidence or instances of clearly erroneous factual findings by the Presiding Justice. In my view, en banc appellate proceedings should be primarily focused on resolving important legal issues that will govern future cases, rather than case-specific factual determinations.

This is an interesting point. The personal information standards in this draft are identical to those in the current Judicial Act. I would appreciate comment from sitting Justices if they have had any responses to these interpretive questions or have experienced challenges applying the current standards.

I stand by my previously expressed views on separation of powers and would argue that whatever tweaks to our rules are necessary, a reform of the Judicial Act is not the place to make them.

I left these comments for last, as they strike me as related and the most conceptually challenging.

The limitation of 3.1(b) to negative injunctions blocking unlawful government action was intentional. For two reasons. First, empowering the Court to direct government officials in the exercise of their constitutional and statutory powers brings the Court perilously close to improper interference in political affairs. Second, and more importantly, the language of the Charter that empowers the Court to hear and decide review requests seems limited in that way. Perhaps reflecting concerns about the Court interfering in political affairs, it refers only to the High Court having “the power to declare any [government action] void upon a determination that it violates the terms of this Charter or any other constitutional law.” The express enumeration of the Court’s authority to void government action in deciding review requests would seem to exclude the possibility of an unenumerated power to order government action in deciding such cases. Put differently, and just to make Pronoun happy, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

That said, one might wonder if the Court would be empowered to order affirmative actions by government officials in its legal question jurisdiction. Maybe. But this draft intentionally channels any such authority into the temporary injunction mechanism, which are both temporally limited and can only be issued for specific reasons. To my mind, that strikes the proper balance between permitting the Court to issue such orders where absolutely necessary and, to quote another Court, transforming the High Court into “continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of executive action.”

On the related AWA point, I certainly considered adding just such a provision. And I’m still open to it, but I think it merits fleshing out what sorts of orders we envision as being necessary to preserve the Court’s jurisdiction. The only one that comes readily to mind is the authority to stay a Presiding Justice’s opinion and orders pending appeal of the underlying case to the full High Court. And perhaps authority to issue a temporary injunction to preserve the status quo where the Presiding Justice handing the case has declined to do so. Any others?

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I’m not sure how much sense this makes. If someone submits an appeal on the argument that a given error was made and a majority of the Court does not actually agree with that, why should the appeal be granted?

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Sorry but okay? That doesn’t really prove anything. Tbh first of all that entire separation of powers provision is usually never used, barely interpreted, and just a lot of loose information.

May I ask why? Where do you think is a better place? I am concerned you said that considered the current bill has a provision which says the Chief Justice can’t run in an election. Which I interpret as a Seperation of Power. So I am really curious where is a better place to put that? I also am advocating for an extension to all Justices, both Chief and Associate if that wasn’t really clear before.

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I think we have to land this discussion in the realities of our community. We are a small community, no matter how many thousands of nations exist in the gameside region, so the notion that not even Associate Justices should hold other offices despite the fact that 90% of the time the Court is not actively considering cases would relegate potentially highly skilled members to a single, mostly inactive job at the expense of their very valuable contributions to regional work.

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Uh, what? We use it every time we don’t have someone holding two offices of the Coalition?

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Sorry but this is blatantly false. We have a large community for my standards both gameside and off-site. I also don’t see how that relates to a court with justices and their activity because it doesn’t. Basic activity doesn’t relate to the court.

I am giving you an example of another region that has Separation of Powers and also is a democracy: NBB. NBB, has the same format as TSP. With the three branches etc. But they have separation of powers with the court and Executive. They are very experienced people, but they are barred from running for office.

TSP should do the same, if we are a democracy. It doesn’t matter if we are giving up these highly skilled members. We need to move on anyway. The new generation of leadership will come in. Those politicians have done their work and now it’s time to let new politicians do work and letting the court not have separation of powers, since mostly people running in these elections nowadays are justices, and if that continues and there’s no separation of powers it will stop the new generation of leadership coming in.

I have said this before as well. Having Justices be PM at the same time is just wrong in the first place. It increases the chance of abuse of power and the PM/Associate Justice violating the Criminal Code in the first place. Someone who is part of the Judicial Branch shouldn’t be head of the Executive Branch it’s just wrong.

I am NOT calling anyone out here but it’s a legitimate concern and concept.

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Sure but that’s the only case. Other wise it is what I said: usually never used, barely interpreted, and just a lot of loose information.

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I don’t know what kind of moral principles you have but where I come from we don’t violate the Criminal Code regardless of what position we have. One wouldn’t violate it as Prime Minister any more than one would as Chief Justice, Associate Justice, or as a private citizen. What office one does or doesn’t hold has no bearing on one’s willingness to violate the Criminal Code and I can’t even begin to unpack where you get this idea in the first place.

This paints a very different picture of your motivation for insisting on “separation of powers”. If what you truly want is to get different people to win elections then draft people to gain experience and run for office, don’t just mask yourself behind the idea of “separation of powers”.

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What does this mean? The law prevents something, and that thing doesn’t happen.

“Hey the law says you can’t murder people.”
“Oh but nobody gets murdered here.”
“Ah. But that’s the only use case. Other than preventing murder, the law is never used.”

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This isn’t about my moral values and it’s never should be about it. This is an issue I am legitimately trying to address. I disagree with everything said right here. You should know this yourself even since you used to be chief justice for years. The more power you have the more you are able to violate the Criminal Code and that means Prime Ministers that are concurrently also Associate Justices have a higher chance of breaking the criminal code. Doesn’t matter if you’re a citizen, legislator, or something much smaller. The dangers of Prime Ministers also being associate justices at the same time and breaking the criminal code more easily is doable.

Plus you don’t know what happens behind the scenes most of the time. That gives the ability to break the criminal code because nobody knows what the Associate Justice concurrently serving as Prime Minister is doing.

Sorry no? First of all: How will new people ever gain experience if the old guard (which I like to call the previous generation of leadership before me) occupies all positions of power, in multiple branches?

I’m not masking behind anything this is a legitimate issue. It doesn’t mean drafting people it means making it easier for everyone else to run for office. Nobody wants to run because they know they will be beaten by the justices anyway that derives the point of drafting at all. Plus the Associate Justices are already serving an office. They shouldn’t running and serving yet another office on top of that.

That’s fine if you don’t like separation of powers but it should be incorporated and not just ignored.