[2508.AB] Executive Reform

Assembly
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Greetings to the Assembly.

The current executive system is imperfect. We know this. We’ve lived it for years. Every election has the question asked, “What Ministry is coming back next time?” It’s hard to plan and harder to maintain institutional memory as a result. This draft aims to change that.

We’re introducing Departments as bastions of that memory, with civil servants to execute the policies and agenda of the elected/appointed officials. This might seem onerous, but the express hope and intent is that enforcing certain limitations on the structure of the executive can free up that time and energy spent on more substantive matters.

We’re also formalizing certain critical Ministries, but without directly electing those positions. We figure what’s written is a good compromise between flexibility and structure.

Open to thoughts. Co-written with @Welly.

New Executive
The following is all new.
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In general I support making permanent ministries, but I’m not a big fan of adding more unnecessary bloat to the Charter.

I propose the following modified version instead:

Charter
Executive Act

Additions and subtractions included for comparison

Other Amendments
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I’ll be honest and I have a few comments reading over it.

  1. “Departments”? Nah, I prefer to use the term Secretariat. Will anything change? Yes, it will be much better.

  2. Being seriously now, I don’t like the idea of secretaries having to be approved to be removed. For me, this entire body would be pointed out directly by the PM and removed as they wished.
    To tell you the truth, I don’t even like the idea of needing the Assembly’s approval for the position. So:

I would make a change regarding the name Department, but it is not as important as the above.

In fact, I agree with Cyro. We can leave the organization of the executive branch itself to a separate law, not the Charter.

And I cannot help but say that I do not agree with the change in the Treaties Act. It is fine as it is in the current law.

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This feels needlessly bureaucratic and a massive overcorrection to the current situation of not having stable ministries.

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I thought about it, but would just defining the Ministries in law/Charter be enough?
Along with the Article V reform presented here, I think it would be a good idea, with a few corrections here and there.

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There is much to consider on this topic. Regarding permanent ministries, @Welly and I briefly discussed this in my PM campaign thread. I will copy my response from that discussion here, as I believe it may be relevant to this conversation.

Expanding upon that, while the idea of establishing certain permanent ministries may provide stability in core governmental functions, imposing strict limits on the Prime Minister’s ability to create additional ministries is an unnecessary and harmful constraint. The Prime Minister must have broad discretion to shape their government, ensuring that ministries align with their policy agenda and the evolving needs of the region. Locking the executive branch into a rigid structure of fixed ministries would hinder responsiveness to emerging challenges and policy shifts. I think the proposal rightly acknowledges that, if permanent ministries are established, their ministers should be appointed by the Prime Minister rather than directly elected. A reasonable compromise, therefore, would be to enshrine the ministries listed in the proposal while preserving the Prime Minister’s power to create and dissolve additional ministries as needed. I don’t see any good reason reason to limit the Prime Minister to two additional ministers without a portfolio.

The mixing of terminology in this context is rather confusing. We should adopt a consistent terminology and refer to these executive bodies either as ministries or departments, rather than having permanent departments subordinate to ministries. I would argue in favor of “ministries,” as this is the established terminology currently used in TSP. Moreover, I think it would be better in this case, to establish a permanent Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a permanent Ministry of World Assembly Legislation, though I would personally rather include the latter in the former. In my opinion, there is no compelling reason to change the existing terminology.

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I agree with this and additionally I believe that ministers should not require approval by the Assembly. That requirement imposes an unnecessary constraint on the Prime Minister’s ability to shape their own cabinet and, to some extent, undermines the voters’ choice in electing a Prime Minister. By subjecting ministerial appointments to Assembly approval, the will of the electorate can effectively be overridden. The Assembly’s existing power to recall a minister already serves as a sufficient check on the executive.

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That’s nonsense. The Assembly has a natural obligation to hold the Prime Minister to account and to ensure that those appointed as ministers are minimally qualified to perform their assigned duties.

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Well, if the Assembly refuses to approve the Prime Minister’s appointments, it could significantly limit the implementation of the Prime Minister’s agenda. Given that the voters have elected a Prime Minister based on a specific platform, it is only reasonable that the Prime Minister should have sole authority to appoint and dismiss cabinet members to effectively carry out that agenda. To my knowledge, neither Canada nor the UK require parliamentary approval for cabinet appointments, so that function is neither a natural role of the Assembly nor does my proposition lack precedent or rationale. If the Assembly loses confidence in the effectiveness and activities of a minister, they can present a motion of no confidence. Given that a no confidence vote requires a three-fifths majority, that in itself limits the Assembly’s ability to shape the Prime Minister’s agenda while ensuring a sufficient check on the executive.

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Why is the Prime Minister’s agenda so important and time-sensitive that it cannot wait for proper vetting from the Assembly?

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This whole thing honestly confuses me. I like the idea of having a bigger ministry and having permanent ones but I feel the secretaries and the Minister of that ministry are basically going to have the same job.

I disagree with Silva on some of his edits. I believe the Secretaries should appoint the Undersecretaries but with the approval of the Prime Minister.

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This might have been a fine draft without the departments.

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Feel free to remove them, then.

That was snippier than intended. I do think formalizing a civil service is a good thing, but obviously my idea will need some changes if that’s the direction we intend to go towards.

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Why do you tie the formalisation of a civil service to the existence of departments? It seems to me that departments are nothing more than an unnecessary middle level of bureaucracy between staffers and ministers.

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Well, if a civil service exists solely at the behest of the executive, then the executive could simply abolish it a la staffers and ambassadors two years ago. If the Assembly is mandating certain ministries and departments/offices, then there is a block to deliberate removing institutional knowledge, on top of providing a structure for newcomers to join in that isn’t “well the next PM might not keep that ministry”.

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I’m not challenging the concept of a civil service, I’m questioning why you’re trying it to the division of ministries and departments.

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If you’re pursuing institutional memory, then you should have a Department of Yelling at People to Use the Forums.

I’m curious — since you mentioned to me elsewhere that this took some inspiration from my ministries and offices idea — why the departments are placed within ministries. As I wrote back then,

The solution isn’t to just draw a line around the bureaucracy in red marker and pat ourselves on the back for differentiating them. The bureaucracy is unnecessary if you identify the components that actually warrant a civil service. (For instance: I have no problem wants to have someone else be the line of communication with ‘Senior Roleplayers,’ whatever that means, but to make it a requirement seems like a stretch. I am sure our ministers are capable enough to, like, talk to people.)

And even for a civil service, this degree of insulation from the rest of the executive doesn’t seem like it actually promotes institutional memory. To the contrary, it exacerbates the issue where we have small numbers of people with specialized knowledge that doesn’t get passed down. Why would it? They’re not going anywhere. Certainly not if they’re a Permanent Secretary. As long as they know what they’re doing, things will be fine… right?

The issue is that executive control and executive memory are closely related. If someone’s just off doing their own thing — and they have some specialty that feels unapproachable to outsiders — then at best others feel walled off and at worst others are walled off. A department doesn’t actually encourage people to document their knowledge, share it with others, or be open to contributions. In fact, I fear this proposal makes them so insulated, despite nominally being contained within a ministry, that it leaves elected and Assembly-approved officials in charge of departments they can’t really control.

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It’s what I could think of.

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What’s wrong with just having ministries? Why is a separate level with something called “departments” needed in the first place?

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Because the Prime Minister receives a political mandate from the voters and has a limited time to fulfill it. The ministers, in my view, serve merely as an extension of that mandate. I favor a system that prioritizes governability and efficiency while ensuring continuous oversight by the Assembly.

I agree, and while I would prefer to maintain the status quo, I am willing to support the proposal to make the most central ministries permanent if that is the will of the Assembly’s majority. However, the proposal in its current form establishes a structure that is far too rigid.

I support the idea of a strong civil service and, as I proposed during my PM campaign, the establishment of a cursus honorum to facilitate the advancement of newcomers into positions of power. I acknowledge that this stance may appear somewhat contradictory to my belief that the Prime Minister should have the authority to create and abolish ministries at will. To reconcile these positions, I envsion a system that effectively establishes a talent pool. While the cursus honorum would be linked to ministries, it would function largely independently of that structure, creating a pool of qualified candidates from which future Prime Ministers could select their cabinet members. Such a system would allow us to maintain institutional knowledge and support the advancement of newcomers without the need for permanent ministries.

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