The CRS should act proactively, where the Assembly allows it to, in conducting intelligence operations, inquiring about suspicious characters attempting to join South Pacifican institutions, including key ones like the Assembly and the SPSF, but it also exists as a body of highly-trusted individuals that the region should trust in order to restore the Coalition to power in the event of a coup d’etat. Right now, I think the region lacks some of that trust, since the only person sending out anything close to regular communications is the one who is best positioned to conduct a coup d’etat, but this is a resolvable issue.
The CRS, the body charged with oversight of the Coral Guard, have never once spoken to me about their displeasure in my endotarting or in my endorsement count. I would appreciate their input on these statements before answering your two questions involving the Coral Guard.
The CRS has to sacrifice a measure of their internal security in the interests of public trust. That involves disclosing who is communicating on discussions such as Curlyhoward and the endorsement cap and Impersonation Preparedness, and the timelines of such discussions as well, as the Assembly tried to receive during the discussion on the Line of Succession. Not only that, but as mentioned above, more members of the CRS should be communicating with the region more frequently, as a means of introducing and keeping in the region’s short term memory the nations who would be responsible for both regional comms in the event of a crisis and who is trying to restore the government they reside under and (hopefully) would want to see returned to power.