Yes, with apologies. I should have time tomorrow. I realize this discussion has been going on for some time, so I will do my utmost to get my thoughts in soon.
Alright, I’m sorry it has taken me so long to get to this, but here are my thoughts and a revised set of amendments.
Most significantly, we should clarify which officer or entity exercises ultimate authority over the military. Whomever you think should lead the military, it is at least debatable under current law who actually does. Is it the Prime Minister, the Admiralty, or some combination? I find the following provisions of law extremely difficult to reconcile.
Again, whatever one’s views on this issue, control over military forces does not strike me as an area of regional law in which we would want significant ambiguity.
With that said, I am a believer in civilian control over the military, which is reflected in the proposed amendments below. The Prime Minister is the head of our civilian government, is elected by the entire citizenry, and is ultimately accountable to them. The Admiralty is not elected, and it is subject to democratic control only via the relatively radical option of removal by the Assembly (a body which is not comprised of all TSP citizens). In a democracy, the people’s elected representatives should set overall military policy within the bounds of law.
To be sure, that does not mean the PM should regularly dictate the details of military operations, planning, or tactics. In the mine run of circumstances, those decisions should be left to the experts, i.e., the Admirals. In other words, the Admiralty should be the primary entity leading the military, but the PM should have ultimate supervisory authority. That is the balance I have tried to strike in the below proposal.
In light of these amendments to clarify the military’s leadership, I have also proposed eliminating the one Admiral rule. If the PM is clearly in ultimate command of the military, then it can continue to function even in the absence of Admirals.
Without further throat clearing, here is the proposal:
Amendments to the Charter
X. THE MILITARY
Creating an official military for the purposes of regional defense, war, and gameplay.
(1) The South Pacific Special Forces will be the official military forces of the Coalition. Their responsibilities will be to defend the coalition, enact the government’s military policies abroad, foster activity for the region, and serve as the military representative of the Coalition’s power and influence.
(2) The military will be led by the Prime Minister, who may appoint a board of admirals approved by the Assembly.along with a board of admirals appointed by the Prime Minister and approved by the Assembly. The Prime Minister and Admiralty The Admiralty, which shall comprise the Prime Minister and the board of admirals, may establish further hierarchy, create programs, and appoint deputies as they see necessary.
Amendments to the Military Code
1. Admiralty
(1) The Admiralty is a commission comprising up to three Captains and the Prime Minister, or their appointed designee. A Captain on the Admiralty shall be called an Admiral.
(2) The Admiralty shall be the supremeprimary entity leading the military, hold responsibility for the planning and overseeing all missions of the military, decide all personnel matters including applications and promotions, and handle disciplinary actions as a tribunal.
(3) In case of a vacancy on the Admiralty, the Prime Minister may appoint a Captain with approval by the Assembly to become an Admiral. Should there be no Admirals, the military shall not operate except for the self-defense of the South Pacific, for the defense of an ally, or for the purposes of explicit treaty obligations.
3. Rules
(1) A member of the military must show respectful behavior towards a superior, must not bully, humiliate, or intimidate their subordinates, and must not act in an unbecoming manner toward their peers.
(2) A member of the military may not intentionally or recklessly disobey a lawful command given by a superior, or intentionally or recklessly put at risk, delay, or otherwise disrupt a lawful operation.
(3) A member of the military may onlynot be a member of another military with assent of the Admiralty, which it may rescind at any time and for any reason. If the member’s other military is on the opposing side of an arbitrary R/D conflict, the member may not change sides for the duration of the operation, and shall be considered suspended from the military for the duration of the operation should they be engaged on the opposing side.
One thing that I thought was important to highlight and specify here would be what happens to the SPSF while the new Admiral is not approved by the Assembly, I mean, during the voting period, is it activities suspended?
Regarding this, in the first quote, it is understood that the Admiralty does not include the Prime Minister, which does not occur in the second quote. Not that it’s very relevant, but I think it would be good to standardize.
Last thing, what’s the difference between this and what we have now?
Support for Welly’s amendments, although I have a few comments to add here soon.
Under the proposed amendments, nothing would happen to the SPSF while a new Admiral’s nomination is pending or if it is rejected by the Assembly. That’s already the case unless there are no other admirals in office, but by repealing the “one admiral rule,” the amendments make clear that the SPSF can continue to function even if no admirals are currently in office.
I’m not sure I follow. In the first quote, the Admiralty does include the Prime Minister. The second quote references the “Admiralty” in general, which, as defined in the first quote, comprises up to three Captains and the Prime Minister.
Currently, the text indicates that the military will be led by the Prime Minister “along” with a board of admirals. That language, when combined with the Military Code provision declaring the Admiralty to be the “supreme entity leading the military,” makes it unclear who really holds ultimate authority over the military, the PM or the Admiralty. Editing both provisions clarifies that it is the PM.
I believe what Silva is referring to is how the first quote says “The Prime Minister and Admiralty,” saying, or at least creating the implication that the Prime Minister is not a part of the Admiralty, while the second quote says “The Admiralty is a commission comprising up to three Captains and the Prime Minister,” which clearly highlights that the PM is a part of the Admiralty.
Ah, now I understand. Thank you for the clarification. I agree that language is confusing. I will edit accordingly.
Oh, right, that explains, thanks. It’s definitely a great draft.
I’m strongly opposed to changing a system that works well, and was designed based on extensive experience of what works and doesn’t work in NS Military GP, on the basis of IRL political theory.
Does anyone have any other objections?
Are you implementing @Welly 's amendments?
Also @ProfessorHenn said he had more substantive comments to make as well.
Broadly-speaking I am in support of any amendment that implements direct oversight over the SPSF by the executive.
Yes, the intention is to take their draft to a vote
Oh, right
Hard agree, and I offer full support for the amendments as written. My thoughts on the proposal text have shifted since the draft was first posted, although my concerns have been allayed by the edits since. Looks good, send it.
That said, I move Welly’s draft to a vote.
I second the motion to move Welly’s draft to a vote.
It’s bizarre to suggest that the military somehow isn’t under civilian control — the Assembly has a direct role in defining the parameters within which the military operates and the leadership which organized those operations. Civilian control of the military doesn’t just mean direct election (otherwise there’s a shocking portion of our government not under civilian control!), it means the civilian component of government has control over the military apparatus, which it does.
Unlike in real life, NS militaries do not have the capability to impose martial law. They do not have the capability to threaten citizens and members with force. They do not have the capability to coup and install one of their own commanders as the delegate.
In my time in military leadership, I’ve maintained a system to document every single operation carried out by the SPSF. If the Assembly still feels like that doesn’t give it enough ability to ask the hard questions when necessary… well, I’d hope there’d be a lot more hard questions asked of parts of government, that supposedly are under civilian control, who haven’t aimed for anywhere near that kind of transparency
We are now at a vote!
This is quite literally a case of people who don’t do MilGP, and don’t understand MilGP, trying to change the way which we do MilGP - and a way which has worked really well for TSP - for no reason whatsoever.
Okay, guys, I need you here again.
As it was voted, the Assembly refused to approve a draft written by Welly that started from this topic. So I’m really interested to hear what you think of my original draft, as it doesn’t change the way the SPSF is run, it just fills a gap in the law, which I see as essential for us to correct.
Thank you.
I don’t think the “gaps” you believe you are closing actually exist, all your changes do is make it illegal for a member of the SPSF to also be part of another military org eg. TITO, RRA, etc, which I don’t think is a good idea.