Would this be more preferable?
I think drawing a distinction for all resignations is a little… odd. I mean, sometimes the Prime Minster resigns and we have a special election for a longer-than-usual term. If we want re-confirmation votes for regular-length terms — which we have routinely and consistently held — then I don’t know why we wouldn’t want them for a longer term.
I think we should exclude caretaker Prime Ministers from that — I don’t know if that’s what ‘successor’ does but ‘elected successor’ might be clearer. But also, to be honest, I’m struggling to parse the grammar of this. It’s not obvious to me that “until the Prime Minister’s successor enters office” applies only to cases where the Prime Minister ceases to hold office and not to cases where the minister is dismissed?
I motion to cancel the vote.
Taking a step back from legislative language for a second, I think it would be good to think about this problem in terms of what is our ideal vision for what “should” happen in these cases.
- When a new PM is elected and takes office at the start of a full term, their entire Cabinet should have to be confirmed. In the case of some Ministers who are holdovers from the previous administration, that will be a re-confirmation. Since at regularly scheduled elections we have a week of transition, the incoming PM generally uses that transition to start naming their Cabinet.
- A caretaker PM should not be expected to name and confirm a new Cabinet—their job is to prevent things from falling apart/ensure basic governance happens.
- If a PM takes office after a resignation/recall, I think it would make sense to add a grace period where the old Cabinet can still operate legally but reconfirmation is eventually necessary. Perhaps it could be a week to mirror the interim period between PMs at a regular election.
3 Likes
To be fair, the law does technically say that the Prime Minister can appoint the Cabinet, not the elected future Prime Minister who hasn’t taken office yet (and theoretically could have the results of their election disputed).
I feel like the caretaker term is a grace period? Alternatively, if we allow the Prime Minister-elect to provisionally nominate ministers prior to taking office or something, we could extend the caretaker term to accommodate that (and electoral disputes, if any) and the Prime Minister could start the term with a Cabinet instead of sitting around waiting for the Assembly confirmation votes to happen.
1 Like
I disagree for resignations. For recalls, reconfirmation makes sense, but similarly, why can’t we just (re)implement the old distinction between a recall and a no confidence vote?
It’s entirely possible the Assembly can lack confidence in the Prime Minister but have it in the Cabinet. For example, uh, right now, it seems.
2 Likes
I’m pretty sure there is a difference between a recall and a no-confidence vote:
Well, the continued distinction just supports the idea that a resignation or recall of the Prime Minister should not terminate the Cabinet’s offices and require re-confirmation. A new Prime Minister can change things, sure, but dismissals should not be automatic because if the Assembly wants to do away with the whole Cabinet, there exists a mechanism to do so. If recalling the Prime Minister is going to become tantamount to recalling the whole Cabinet, there is no reason for that distinction to exist.
3 Likes
If we have a new Prime Minister then I would not really consider it the same Cabinet — unless the newly elected Prime Minister has literally the exact same agenda as their predecessor, I struggle to imagine that the minister would be implementing the policies that they represented to the Assembly at the time of their confirmation.
I’m opposed to a system that allows Cabinet ministers to serve terms under different Prime Ministers implementing two different agendas while only getting confirmed once.
I expect specially elected Prime Ministers to come in with ideas of their own, not to just do whatever their predecessor did. Of course, they may want to retain some ministers. I don’t think that’s any different from why we’d want re-confirmation of ministers for regularly elected Prime Ministers.
1 Like
That is, of course, a rather moot point. The Prime Minister has the power to shuffle around the Cabinet after their appointment throughout the term. To terminate the continued service of Cabinet upon recall or resignation would endanger stability.
It is more important therefore to follow a process of handover and transition following the complete transition to a new Executive, irrespective of fresh ideas or alternative plans a new Prime Minister may have. Cabinet will follow the agenda as required by law until their suitable replacements are confirmed.
I’m not sure how this is relevant? If a minister is retained in a Cabinet shuffle, they’re still working in the same role they were confirmed for under the same Prime Minister that they were confirmed to work with. That’s not the same as a minister working under a different Prime Minister.
That’s not the proposal though — I think we are in agreement that the Cabinet can continue to serve under a caretaker Prime Minister. I also think the framing of “termination” is just convenient for writing the law, but it’s not any impediment to any or all ministers being retained, just as saying that ministers cease to hold their position when a regularly elected Prime Minister takes office basically just has the same effect as our current system except our retention vote is an actual retention vote.
What are suitable replacements? A new Prime Minister may introduce a different set of minister positions. They may keep a minister position in name but change how they define the role. They may announce some nominations initially and then later announce additional nominations. The law provides no 1:1 matching of positions to replace ministers.
I don’t think I got my point across quite clearly there.
All I mean is that it’s quite unclear why offices of the Coalition’s Government must be left vacant for any period of time when some of these roles are performing crucial tasks for the continuity of service to the community and its members.
Here’s my proposed Amendment:
V. The Executive
(1) The Prime Minister shall be the Head of the Executive Branch of the Coalition. They shall be responsible for—
- implementing their electoral mandate,
- being a liaison between the government and the members of the Coalition,
- interacting with foreign regions and organizations,
- directing the regional military,
- making appointments to positions within the government,
- promoting regional culture,
- overseeing the Coalition’s interest in World Assembly matters,
- integrating new members into the community,
- defending the Coalition’s interests, and
- any other duty required by law.
(1A) The Prime Minister may appoint any member of the Coalition to aid and advise the Prime Minister into the Executive, which shall be collectively called “The Cabinet” and may delegate any duties outlined in clause (1) of this Article to such member.
(2) The Cabinet shall serve at the pleasure of the Prime Minister.
(3) Any appointment to Cabinet by the Prime Minister shall be confirmed by the Assembly by a vote of simple majority.
(4) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), an incumbent Minister shall not be subject to a re-confirmation vote save for where the Prime Minister modifies the duties, titles, or seniority of such Minister during the course of their term.
(5) The Prime Minister may issue further regulations through Cabinet Orders to adequately conduct their executive business.
(6) Subject to any law for the time being in force or enacted pursuant to clause (5) of this Article, a Minister may, with the approval of the Prime Minister, appoint Deputy Ministers to aid and assist them in performing duties delegates to them by the Prime Minister.
I hope that satisfies both sides of the equation, where the demands of Assembly Supremacy are countered by the need for smooth transitions and limiting the vacuums that resignations and removals inevitably create in the offices of Ministers.
That strikes me as a substantive change on multiple fronts beyond, like, writing into law the votes we already regularly hold?
Addressed:
The Amendment proposed, in Art. V cl. (5) addresses the above, stating—
“save for where the Prime Minister modifies the duties, titles, or seniority of such Minister during the course of their term.”
The intended effect is to cover all the situations where the Office of Prime Minister becomes vacant while retaining the need for Assembly authorisation to hold and exercise office.
Objectives
Despite being a substantive rewrite of extant law, the need to resolve ambiguities in—
- Continuation of Government functions during a vacancy in the office of the Prime Minister, arising from a recall—
- An Amendment concerning the appointment of “Members of the Coalitions” to aid and assist the Prime Minister, instead of only citizens, pursuant to the principle the Assembly Affirmed through the Cultural Act Amendment[1].
- An Amendment to add the words “any other duty required by law.” to the list of duties that the Prime Minister is expected to carry out, and general grammar fixes (will to shall, etc.)
The Amendment meets the criteria for continued Assembly voice on appointments, hopes to provide scaffolding to an executive that might need to transition between different governments (appointed or elected) and not leave the ongoing work of the offices (especially in matters of Regional Defence, Foreign Affairs, Culture and Onsite Activity, Integration, and World Assembly Affairs) in a lurch during said transition.
Additionally, I hope that the Amendment gives flexibility to Prime Ministers (caretaker or elected) irrespective of the length of their terms to manage their affairs and the goals of their terms with as much ease and comfort as possible.
The Amendment avoids an issue that was raised here:
Where Amended Article V, cl. (4)—
would, in conjunction with subsequent clause (5)’s provision, ensure that the vote of the Assembly is mandatory for the Appointment to succeed and for retention, in between terms (again, whether they be elected terms or caretaker terms) to be legally meaningful only where the role and responsibilities of the Ministerial incumbent or nominee for Appointment changes.
It would also, in essence, give a new legal definitions to Appointment, including within its ambit any changes to an existing Cabinet official’s title, responsibility, or seniority.
[A2605.08] Amendment to the Cultural Act ↩︎
What is the “seniority” of a minister? What are the “titles” (plural)?
The “duties” language also strikes me as a substantive change from the current law which allows the Prime Minister to delegate statutory powers but not responsibility.
In my opinion, ministers should be citizens. The amendment to the Cultural Act was about the way in which the law defined “South Pacificans” but the current law is deliberate about saying that citizens can be appointed as ministers.
Uh, I don’t think that’s a good thing, to be honest.
Suppose, hypothetically, that a Minister of Foreign Affairs with the duties of “interacting with foreign regions and organizations.” If a new Prime Minister is elected with a different foreign affairs agenda but wants to keep the same Minister of Foreign Affairs, I think we should still hold a vote as the Assembly. Even if we have the same chief diplomat with the same responsibilities on paper, it’s clear that they would be working towards a different aim.
In general, I think ministers should be confirmed not just for a particular title or role, but in the context of working with a particular Prime Minister towards their agenda. That agenda comes from the ideas and opinions put forth during elections, not legal requirements set in law, and it can change between terms (even if the incumbent wins re-election, their campaign is usually not a carbon copy of the previous term).
Presumably, the Cabinet structure will allow for delegation of responsibilities in a hierarchical manner and enable Cabinet to function even during the absence of the Prime Minister, occassioned by whatever circumstances.
There is nothing in the Charter preventing a single person from holding multiple roles within the Executive, although traditionally that has rarely, if ever, happened. If the Prime Minister wishes to create a ridiculous catena of titles for their Ministerial Appointee, then let them.
In what context is that difference really material to any argument. The Prime Minister has the statutory power under Article V cl. (1) as it currently stands to direct the SPSF. Do they not delegate that responsibility to the MoD by delegating Statutory Power to command troops to them? It is substantive truth that what the Prime Minister delegates to the Ministers is responsibility and duty, and may withhold power from them as they please (a la Cabinet Order 69 and its subsequent withdrawal).
It would perhaps be best to enable non-citizens (Residents, at the very least) to hold Ministerial Staff positions, to aid and assist the Minister in carrying out certain duties. It is no surprise that, for instance, RMBers in the Coalition have a disconnect from the offsite community on many issues, and having someone available on hand to bridge that gap within, say MoI or MoC, at least with a modicum of legitimate authority (granted, of course, by this Assembly in the manner accustomed) and responsibility for its affairs.
So within this hypothesis, let us say during the course of a term, an event outside the control of the Executive forces the Prime Minister to instruct the MoFA to pivot and adopt a new strategy or diplomatic posture, we’d have to reconfirm them?
And, as mentioned earlier, on circumstances that arise during the term. Rigidly expecting everything to go according to campaign promises is neither useful nor reasonable, and limits the horizon of possibilities that the Executive can fulfill. Loosening a lot of the tightness surrounding its regulation within the Charter may be a significant step for the region but in my view, a necessary one.
In my view, not necessarily — the Prime Minister can delegate their statutory power, but that doesn’t mean they’re not responsible for what their minister does with that power. That is, just because it’s not a regular “duty” for the Prime Minister to do something themselves does not mean they’re not responsible for knowing or caring about what the minister is doing with their delegated powers.
This is already the case. Current law has no requirement that executive staff be citizens. If you want to change that for ministers as well — as your proposal would — then I think that deserves to be its own proposal, because I don’t really see why that needs to be tied to codifying the minister re-confirmation votes we already regularly hold.
I did not say that?
We already routinely votes to re-confirm ministers retained by the Prime Minister (at least for regularly scheduled terms). By “routinely” I mean that you can find examples here or here or here or here, or in some cases the Chair didn’t even format the vote differently but this is another example.
I am suggesting that we keep that system and actually codify it. What your proposal would do is prohibit such votes unless the Prime Minister modifies a minister’s “duties, titles, or seniority.” I do not think that such a proposal “satisfies both sides of the equation” nor is it limited in effect to addressing “the vacuums that resignations and removals inevitably create.”
So yes, theoretically, the Cabinet can do an about-face in the middle of the term. Anybody confirmed by the Assembly could do something different than what they promised at the time of confirmation. In the case of the Cabinet, however, I think it’s more accurate to say that the Prime Minister builds a team to help them implement their agenda (usually the one they, like, just campaigned on), and thus I think it makes sense to hold new confirmation votes when the person leading that team changes (or returns to office after a new campaign and thus a new agenda).
You are more than welcome to advocate for broader executive reform, but at some point, we should call a spade a spade, and I think that your proposal is closer to executive reform than it is to just addressing minister re-confirmation votes.
Nothing in the proposed Amendment changes this fact.
Fair enough, I suppose.
I was genuinely just asking. No offense meant.
Which, I think, should be the case, even if we tinker around with the words a bit more.
Assembly confirmation should only bolster confidence in the ability of the incumbent in taking on new or different duties, or on a nominee taking up new duties within the Executive. As you (and Griff) said earlier, there is no legal effect to reconfirmation and failure is only an advisory opinion of sorts.
In that context, my amendment makes continued service in the role dependent on confirmation and codifies the relation between this body and the Executive better. I’m open to suggestions on tweaks to it, though.
Oh absolutely. If the outcome of redefining what “confirmation votes” do, in practice, and what “reconfirmation” would mean, legally, is an outcome more tilted towards Executive Reform, then that’s par for the course, no?