[2429.AB] IRV Amendment, Redux

Also understandable.

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Motion to vote

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Second.

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It’s unfortunate, really, that the debate here never actually considered the merits of IRV. Does anyone (other than maybe Belschaft) actually like IRV for Delegate elections? Or do they just like consistency? What are the advantages of IRV over other ranked voting systems?

I think the reasons why we use approval voting for the Delegacy are good ones — it makes sense that the Delegate, our head of state who also happens to wield significant power in terms of game mechanics, is someone who voters broadly trust and approve of. We can aim for a ‘weaker’ version of this with expanding approvals, or by electing the Condorcet winner: the candidate that a majority of voters would support in a one-on-one race against any other candidate.

IRV doesn’t accomplish this. To quote Belschaft from six years ago, IRV “preference[s] candidates with strong first-preference support from distinct electoral bases, so as to provide a distinct and meaningful choice in the in-game sta[g]e.” Is anybody else advocating for this? We can have reasonable arguments about whether we want candidates for Delegate to be more politically divided. But I think it’s strange to rush ahead to a vote without actually considering these ramifications.

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I do, I think I have mentioned or hinted at it before

We are now at a vote!

I stand by my view that electoral systems that preference strong first round support are a good thing.