Fair. I must say that I remain largely neutral. But if the prevailing sentiment is opposed, I would rather abandon vote editing than see it sink the entire proposal.
Maybe we are just looking at this differently, but I draw a distinction between whether we need a provision of law and whether that provision is simply beneficial or an improvement on the status quo. Even if a proposal is not necessary in the sense that our government would suffer grave harm in the absence of its enactment, I still support legislation that, on balance, is likely to produce more positive outcomes than negative.
That is essentially how I feel about these provisions. True, the region could probably survive without a Prime Minister (and Cabinet in the case RON wins) for a short period. But we have such offices for a reason. At least from the standpoint of continuity of government and regional leadership, it is better to have an executive than not. So then the question becomes whether the risks of having a caretaker executive outweigh those benefits. And I simply don’t see any substantial risks created by these provisions. True, a PM or Cabinet could try to stay in office by promoting a RON win, but that is an immense amount of effort just to secure a few more days in office. It’s hard to imagine the incumbent government successfully persuading the citizenry to vote RON more than once. Or, if the government is so popular and the other candidates so weak that such a result would be possible, then it would make more sense for the incumbent PM just to run for reelection. Continuously endorsing RON seems a curious way to maintain power. As for the CRS provision, it is, of course, conceivable that the CRS could install a stooge as caretaker PM. But we trust the CRS with much more radical authority–including the power to dissolve the executive and judicial branches and rule by decree. So I’m comfortable entrusting them with this relatively modest and time-delimited power.
The PM and Delegate elections are identical across all substantive dimensions-- voter qualifications, candidate qualifications, and scope of office. All citizens can vote, candidates need only be citizens to run, and the offices at stake are region-wide in authority and responsibility. True, the actual method of counting the votes differs, but that does not change the fundamental nature of the election, i.e., one for a regional officer accountable to the citizenry as a whole. On the other hand, the Chair election is different–only legislators can vote, only legislators can run, and the office’s authority and responsibility are confined to the Assembly.
The difference is akin to that of the election processes for Speaker of the House of Commons or Speaker of the US House of Representatives vs. elections for MPs or Congressional Representatives. The latter are elected by the people directly and are ultimately accountable to them. The Speakers are elected internally by the members of those respective chambers, not pursuant to a general election law, but rather pursuant to those bodies rules of procedure.
I won’t quote all of your response for the sake of space. But I think we are talking past each other here, as I agree with almost everything you said.
To begin with, this proposal does not create an infinite Chairship. Every resolution adopting a Chair must specify the term that Chair will serve, and no resolution can adopt a term longer than 12 months. In that sense, this Chair election procedure operates in a similar–albeit not identical–way to that of the Commons Speaker (and the Commons more generally). The law specifies the maximum term length (one year in the case of the Assembly Speaker, five in the case of the Commons Speaker and MPs). But legislators have the ability to provide for a shorter term should they wish.
I agree with your position that indefinite terms should be reserved for those offices that must be immune to political pressure, and I further agree that the Chair is not such an office. Hence why I have advocated throughout this debate for an outer bound on the length of term that an Assembly resolution adopting a Chair could provide. Indeed, I made an argument similar to yours in responding to the suggestion that an outer bound would be unnecessary (see here.)
Admittedly, a term of 12 months would be the longest non-indefinite term of any regional official. But I don’t think that is inconsistent with the Chair’s role. To be sure, the Chair is not as independent and apolitical as the Speaker of the House of Commons. Nevertheless, both Cryo and Blockbuster have taken a relatively neutral approach to the role–for example, by abstaining from most Assembly votes. Certainly their posture has been far more apolitical than, say, the US House Speaker. I can’t speak to practice prior to Cryo, but I am generally supportive of this stance, especially given the Chair’s responsibility for administering and certifying the results of Assembly votes. And, in any event, the Assembly need not adopt a resolution providing the maximum term length should it prefer a less independent, more immediately accountable Chair.